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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
Assume that you are the franchisee of a nationwide restaurant
chain. Your franchisor has acted contrary to what you believe to be in
your best interest. For the franchisor, bigger is better: more outlets and
discount programs mean higher sales volume and consequently addi-
tional franchise fees and royalties, with royalties typically being based
on gross sales-not franchisee net profits. You are concerned that the
franchisor is oriented more toward expansion than the well-being of ex-
isting franchisees. Franchisor assistance is less than you expected, but
royalties and other charges seem steep.
Facing a strong franchisor that appears not to worry about an indi-
vidual franchisee's complaints, you join with fellow franchisees to press
your claims collectively. This association serves both as a communica-
tions clearinghouse and a means to increase franchisee bargaining
power. In response, however, the franchisor challenges your group in
the following ways: By setting up its own franchisee group or "advisory
council," by seeking to terminate the franchises of supposedly disrup-
tive franchisees, and by insisting that each franchisee-as a separately
owned and operated business-must bargain alone. Even your attorneys
apprise you of the limited rights that franchisee groups may have, and
they warn you about potential antitrust violations.
Franchisee associations are often a natural, indeed necessary, de-
velopment in a maturing franchise system. Why, then, does the law ac-
cord these groups few rights and much potential liability?
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This Article describes the current state of the law, analyzes its va-
lidity and implications, and discusses proposals to protect franchisees,
including franchisee collective bargaining rights and an antitrust ex-
emption for franchisee associations. The following areas of the law are
examined: Constitutional issues, state and federal franchise laws, proce-
dural issues, labor relations law, and antitrust law. As franchising law
continues to develop, the subject of franchisee collective rights ulti-
mately will be on the cutting edge of the law, at the intersection of
franchise, labor, and antitrust law. Thus, this Article analyzes and syn-
thesizes these diverse areas of law, illustrates why none of them protect
franchisees sufficiently, and then recommends changes to the current
legal framework.
B. Review, Analysis, and Recommendations
This Article reveals an overly complex, misguided regulatory envi-
ronment in need of simplification and other practical solutions. The in-
troduction in Part I is followed by Parts II through VI, which lead to
various conclusions about the present state of the law, discussion of the
proposed antitrust exemption, and consideration of other proposals.
Specifically, Part II considers the nature of franchising and the present
and potential regulatory framework. Part III examines franchisees'
rights of association under the first amendment, federal and uniform
statutes, and state law. This Part demonstrates the restricted nature of
the right of association, the lack of guidance that the law furnishes, and
the small prospects for new franchisee associational rights legislation.
Moving from statutes to case law, Part IV outlines alternatives to fran-
chisee group bargaining with franchisors, such as class actions, offensive
collateral estoppel, test cases, administrative measures, and arbitration.
All of these alternatives have acute limitations when compared with
collective bargaining; thus, Part V analyzes the application of labor re-
lations law to franchisee associations. It discusses the possibilities con-
cerning nonemployees, but determines that the present situation offers
little affirmation of franchisee collective rights. Indeed, Part VI suggests
that antitrust law may negate such collective rights by pushing even
benevolent franchisors toward "busting" franchisee groups and provid-
ing an excuse for such "busting" by less benign franchisors.
Finally, Part VII of the Article concludes that, as present or poten-
tial sources of franchisee collective rights, federal labor relations laws
are too far afield, first amendment principles are too general, state
"right of association" statutes are too timidly worded, and group litiga-
tion or arbitration strategies prove too unwieldy. Franchisee associa-
tional rights need to be established clearly and should include the right
to enforce lawful agreements between a franchisee group and its mem-
15051990]
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bers' franchisor. On the other hand, imposing a duty on franchisors to
bargain collectively with franchisee associations would create numerous
problems. Instead, franchisee associations should be protected, as are
labor unions, from the use of antitrust laws against group organizing,
collective negotiating, and other legitimate franchisee association
activities.
II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FRANCHISING
A. The Franchising Concept'
For several decades franchising has been a growing phenomenon of
business organization and sales or services distribution. Franchising has
1. In the words of one authority a franchise is:
an oral or written arrangement for a definite or indefinite period, in which a person [the
franchisor] grants to another person [the franchisee] a license to use a trade name ... and in
which there is a community of interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale,
retail, leasing, or otherwise in a business operation under said license.
H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 1.0312], at 1-17 (rev. ed. 1988) (noting that a
number of state legislatures substantially have adopted this "generic definition"). Other definitions
include the following: "Taking the collection of laws as a whole, the elements of a franchise gener-
ally include an agreement, an owned trademark or trade name under which others are authorized
to operate, and a financial factor such as payment of a franchise fee or a 'community of interest.'"
1 Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 225, at 714 (1988).
[F]ranchising is a system of marketing and distribution whereby a small independent busi-
nessman (the franchisee) is granted-in return for a fee-the right to market the goods and
services of another (the franchisor) in accordance with the established standards and prac-
tices of the franchisor, and with its assistance. In its ideal state, the franchise system forges
the perfect marriage between big business and the small businessman: the franchisor obtains
new sources of expansion capital, new distribution markets, and self-motivated vendors of its
products, while the franchisee acquires the products, expertise, stability, and marketing savvy
usually reserved only for larger enterprises.
Kaufmann, Franchising: Business Strategies and Legal Compliance, in P.L.I. COMMERCIA l LAW &
PRACTICE No. 486, FRANCHISING 1989: BUSINESS STRATEGIES & COMPLIANCE ISSUES 11, 15 (1989) (em-
phasis added).
An alternative to formal integration of manufacturing and distributive activities into a single
enterprise is franchising. Although subject to infinite variations, the basic franchise concept
involves a contractual arrangement whereby one firm supplies certain products, equipment,
and auxiliary services to another which sells the merchandise and disperses services to final
users under terms set, in whole or in part, by the supplying firm. Under a franchise arrange-
ment, the distributing or service firm gives up a certain amount of independence of action in
return for the benefits, usually in the form of financial aid or management expertise, provided
by the franchisor.
C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING 14 (1970) (quoting Preston & Schramm, Dual Distribu-
tion and Its Impact on Marketing Organization, 8 CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1965, at 59, 61).
Fundamentally, the franchisor-franchisee relationship is based on a contract between the par-
ties themselves. See generally Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 N.J.
166, 495 A.2d 66 (1985); UNIFORM FRANCHISE AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 101(7) (Proposed
Official Draft 1987), 1 Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 3600, at 4659-60 (1988) [hereinafter UNIFORM
ACT]; N. AXELRAD & L. RUDNICK, FRANCHISING: A PLANNING AND SALEs COMPLIAN E GUIDE 110
(1987); C. ROSENFIELD, supra, at 14; Fels, Franchising: Legal Problems and the Business Frame-
work of Reference, in BusINEss AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE 9 (J. McCord & I. Cohen
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its antecedents in feudalism and in licenses granted by kings.2 Early
American forerunners include brewer-licensed beer gardens3 and the
I.M. Singer & Co. sewing machine firm,4 both of the 1850s. General Mo-
tors' system began in 1898,5 and Rexall Drugs began in 1902. However,
in all but a few industries that already had applied the system, such as
automobiles, gasoline, and soft drinks,7 the franchising boom began af-
ter World War II.8
Much has been written on the history, problems, and economics of
franchising.' It is axiomatic that franchising itself is not an industry.
eds. 1968); Kaufmann, supra, at 18; Rudnick, The Franchise Relationship: Problem Areas for the
1980s: Part 11-The Legal Status of the Franchise Relationship, 2 FRANCHISE L.J., Winter 1983, at
3.
2. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 37-38 (1766); C. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 1, at 1-4. In the United States, public franchises arose from legislative grants for utili-
ties such as canals, railroads, and banks. See C. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 4.
3. H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 1.01[1], at 1-2.
4. See S. LUXENBERG, ROADSIDE EMPIRES: HOW THE CHAINS FRANCHISED AMERICA 12-13 (1985);
Kaufmann, supra note 1, at 13. Other authorities state that Singer franchising began in the 1860s.
See, e.g., N. AXELRAD & L. RUDNICK, supra note 1, at 1; R. ROSENBERG, PROFITS FROM FRANCHISING
9 (1969); Rudnick, An Introduction to Franchising, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING-AN OVERVIEW
2 (M. Mendelsohn ed. 1984).
5. See N. AXELRAD & L. RUDNICK, supra note 1, at 1; S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 14.
6. See N. AXELRAD & L. RUDNICK, supra note 1, at 1; S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 16.
7. See C. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 6; Fels, The Franchising Phenomenon: An Overview,
in THE FRANCHISING PHENOMENON 1 (J. Rice ed. 1969); Rudnick, supra note 4, at 2-3.
8. P. ZEmMAN, P. AUSBROOK & H. LOWELL, FRANCHISING: REGULATION OF BUYING AND SELLING
A FRANCHISE, 34 C.P.S. (BNA) at A-1 (1983) [hereinafter P. ZEIDMAN]; Fels, supra note 7, at 1;
Kaufmann, supra note 1, at 13-14; Rudnick, supra note 4, at 5. For some industries, such as "fast-
food," the boom began earlier and became much more pronounced than in other fields. All
franchised restaurants (not just fast-food outlets), however, account for little more than one-tenth
of the sales made by firms engaged in franchising. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE
ECONOMY 1985-1987, at 5-6 (1987). Newer types of franchises-those other than restaurants (11%),
gasoline (18%), and motor vehicles (58%)-have furnished much of the recent growth in franchis-
ing. Examples include a full range of services and products such as tax return preparation, foot-
wear, photo development, hair styling, auto repair, recruiting services, clothes shops, modeling
centers, oil change stations, education and training, car rental, home furnishing, printing and copy-
ing services, tools, pets, beverages, beauty aids, weight control, temporary services, real estate,
books, electronics, garden supplies, child care, and health and recreational clubs. Id.; Roman, In-
troduction, in THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA FRANCHISE LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (1984). For an extensive
list of service-product categories and franchised systems, see B. WEBSTER, THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
FRANCHISING 17-24, 238-88 (1986).
9. For some accounts of history, see H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-6; S. Lux-
ENBERG, supra note 4; R. MUNNA, FRANCHISE SELECTION: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 28-30
(1987); and C. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 1-8. For practical problems and economics, see E.
DIXON, J&, THE FRANCHISE ANNUAL (1985); H. KURSH, THE FRANCHISE BOOM (rev. ed. 1968); P.
NORBACK & C. NORBACK, Dow-JoNEs-IRwIN GUIDE TO FRANCHISES (rev. ed. 1982); U. OZANNE & S.
HUNT, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING, REPORT TO THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL
BUSINESS, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (Comm. Print 1971); S. RAAB & G. MATUSKY, THE BLUEPRINT
FOR FRANCHISING A BUSINESS (1987); W. SIEGEL, FRANCHISING (1983); B. SMrrH & T. WEST, BUYING A
FRANCHISE (1986); and B. WEBSTER, supra note 8 at 113. For theoretical economic concepts, see
Caves & Murphy, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572 (1976);
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Instead, it is a method of business that has been employed in various
industries. 10 Franchising is thus both a structure and the action taken
pursuant to that structure. It is a distribution technique that integrates
the distribution system by contract instead of by a centrally controlled
chain of ownership."
There are two principal franchising forms. The predominant
form,' 2 "product and trade name franchising," generally concerns the
licensing of a product line from one company (the franchisor) to a
wholesaler or retailer (the franchisee). Typical examples are automobile
dealerships and gasoline service stations. Occasionally, the franchisee
even may have a role in production, as is the case with many soft drink
bottlers.'3
The other main form of franchising is "business format franchis-
ing."' While smaller in number and total revenue than product and
trade name franchises, it has accounted for most of franchising's growth
over the last four decades. 5 Examples of business format franchising
include restaurants, convenience stores, and personal and business ser-
vices.16 This franchise form consists of a "package" of services or prod-
ucts passed on to the franchisee and requires the franchisee to adhere
to certain operational standards. Usually, a franchisor has developed
successfully a product or service and a business format suitable to the
particular business." The franchisor contracts with franchisees to have
them sell the product or service to the public in accordance with the
franchisor's business format and under the franchisor's trademarks and
service marks.' 8
In either form, the arrangement between franchisor and franchisee
typically is expected to be long-term. 9 The franchisee pays the
franchisor an initial franchise fee plus royalties thereafter and is bound
Mathewson & Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J1. & EcoN. 503 (1985); and
Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 JL. & ECON. 223
(1978).
10. Fels, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that franchising is a "form and method of doing business
... adopted by and used in many varied industries") (emphasis in original omitted).
11. Id.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 8, at 1.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Fels, supra note 1, at 10.
18. Id.
19. See 15 G. GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING § 9A.01, at 9A-2 (1990) (stating that the franchise
agreement establishes a relationship that is intended to last a long time); Caffey & Kaufmann, The
Law of Franchise Relationships: Termination, Nonrenewal, and Transfer, in P.,.I. COMMERCIAL
LAW & PRACTICE No. 486, FRANCHIsING 1989: BusmEss STRATEGIES & COMPLIANCE ISSuES 457, 459
(1989) (observing that there is a 10- to 20-year term for most franchise agreements).
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by a formalized system of control designed to protect the uniformity of
the entire franchised system.20 Franchisors often have concomitant du-
ties to train, attempt to attract customers for, and otherwise assist the
franchisees. Because the franchise contract usually is determined by the
franchisor via a standard form agreement, however, most of the express
contractual obligations fall upon the franchisee.21
B. State Legislation and the FTC Rule
Recognizing that prospective franchisees often face their initial in-
vestment decision without adequate information, many state legisla-
tures have enacted statutes that require franchisors to meet registration
and disclosure obligations. These statutes fall into two categories:
Those that specifically address franchising and those that are geared
more broadly toward all nonexempted "business opportunity" ven-
tures.22 The statutes require franchisors to disclose information directly
20. See 15 G. GLICKMAN, supra note 19, § 9.03[8], at 9-21 to 9-22.
21. See Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 353-54, 437 P.2d 892, 894 (1968)
(stating that franchise contracts almost always are drawn up by the franchisor and presented to
dealers for acceptance without negotiation over terms); S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 262-63
(stating that because "the franchise contract is usually drawn up by the parent, the terms are
usually one-sided"); R. MUNNA, supra note 9, at 116 (noting "highly negative [to franchisees] as-
pects of a typical franchise agreement," and stating that such documents "are not designed for
human relations [but] are more appropriate in a museum of torture devices, as guillotines or im-
paling tools"); see also G. GLICKMAN, supra note 19, at 9-1 to 9-53 (discussing various agreement
provisions to be considered by both parties).
One countervailing trend is the tendency of many potential franchisees to "shop" for the best
franchise available. Presumably, this could lead to greater competition among franchisors and
more bargaining power for prospective franchisees.
22. Several states have registration or disclosure provisions in both franchise laws and busi-
ness opportunity acts, but they may be merely duplicative, or the differences may be reconciled
elsewhere in the statutes thereby clarifying franchisor compliance procedures. Often states simply
exempt those franchisors covered by the state franchise statutes from the business opportunity
registration and disclosure requirements.
The states with franchise legislation are: California, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31,000-31,516 (West
1977 & Supp. 1990); Hawaii, HAW. REv. STAT. § 482E (1988 & Supp. 1989); Illinois, Franchise
Disclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ill. Laws, P.A. 85-551, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 paras. 1701-1744
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-2.5-1 to 23-2-2.5-51 (Burns 1989); Ma-
ryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 345-365 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAWS §§
445.1501-455.1546 (1989 & Supp. 1990); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80C.01-80C.30 (West 1986
& Supp. 1990); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 87-401 to 87-410 (1987) (no registration required);
New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 680-695 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1990); North Dakota, N.D.
CENr. CODE §§ 51-19-01 to 51-19-17 (1989); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 650.005-650.250 (1988);
Rhode Island, Rl. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-28-1 to 19-28-15 (1989); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 37-5A-1 to 37-5A-87 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-557 to 13.1-574
(1985 & Supp. 1988); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.010-19.100.940 (1989); and
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 553.01-553.78 (West 1989) ("Franchise Investment Law"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01-135.07 (West 1989) ("Fair Dealership Law"). The District of Columbia also
has franchise legislation: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1201 to 29-1208 (Supp. 1990).
The states with business opportunity legislation are: Alabama, Deceptive Trade Practices Act
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to prospective franchisees. 3 In addition, franchisors may be obliged to
register and file documents with state authorities.24 Most states man-
date the posting of a surety or performance bond, and most state regu-
latory agencies can conduct investigations. Almost all states that
require registration give their regulatory bodies the authority to deny
registration for failure to meet statutory or administrative standards. 25
(1981), ALA. CODE § 8-19-5(20) (1984) (providing solely substantive regulation, with no disclosure
or registration requirements); California, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.200-1812.221 (West 1985 & Supp.
1990); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-503 to 36-521 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 559.80-559.815 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-410 to 10-
1-417 (1989); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-8-1 to 24-5-8-21 (Burns Supp. 1990); Iowa, IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 523B.1-523B.11 (West 1988); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.801-367.990
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1988); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1821-51:1824 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1990) (providing solely substantive regulation, including surety bond filing, with no disclo-
sure or registration requirements); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4691-4700B (1988 &
Supp. 1989); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 401-415 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Michigan, MICH.
Comp. LAWS §§ 445.902-445.903b (1989); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 59-1701 to 59-1761 (1987)
("Seller-Assisted Marketing Plans"); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-94 to 66-100 (1989);
Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1334.01-1334.99 (Anderson Supp. 1989); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, §§ 801-827 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-57-10 to
39-57-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1989); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-25A-1 to
37-25A-54 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Texas, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-16.01 to 5069-16.17
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990) (requiring disclosure only); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-15-1 to 13-
15-7 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-262 to 59.1-269 (1987); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.110.010-19.110.930 (1989).
23. For example, states have required the franchisor to provide the following: A description
of the franchised business; background on the franchisor's officers, directors, and other principals;
the franchisor's and principals' litigation and bankruptcy history; the franchisee's initial fee, pro-
spective royalties fees, and other fees; the franchisee's total start-up costs; franchisee financing
terms available through the franchisor or an affiliate; franchisee obligations concerning sales,
purchases, and operations; the franchisor's pertinent intellectual property-trademarks, service
marks, and patents; franchisor supervision and assistance of franchisees, including the initial train-
ing program and the site selection process (when applicable); explanations of franchisee exclusive
territories; terms on renewal, termination, repurchase, amendment, or assignment of the franchise
agreement; copies of all pertinent contracts (such as the franchise contract, leases, and purchase
agreements); actual, average, projected, or forecasted franchisee sales, profits, or earnings; the
number of franchises canceled, not renewed, or reacquired by the franchisor; prospective franchise
sales in the next year; financial statements on the franchisor; and the names and addresses of in-
state franchisees. See supra note 22 and statutes cited therein. The information required often
varies greatly from state to state, although use of the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular has
reduced somewhat the divergence. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
24. Some examples of document requirements include: Copies of proposed advertisements
and promotions; information identifying the franchisor and its officers, directors, and sales agents;
copies of the offering circular to be used to discharge franchisor disclosure requirements; page
cross references between subjects discussed in the franchise prospectus and franchise agreement;
and a filing fee. See supra note 22 and statutes cited therein. Filing requirements can vary tremen-
dously depending on the state.
25. Large-scale, financially sound franchisors that exceed a specified net worth (e.g., $5 mil-
lion) and have had a certain number of operating franchises (e.g., 25) in the state over a relatively
long time period (e.g., 5 years) often are exempted from some or all of the registration require-
ments. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-3
(Burns 1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 348(4) (1988) (exemption promulgated by administrative
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In addition to requiring disclosures and registration, many state
statutes regulate the ongoing franchise relationship. These statutes re-
flect a legislative perception that franchisors possess most of the bar-
gaining leverage and may abuse this power.26 These regulatory statutes
typically give franchisees some protection against indiscriminate termi-
nation. In most instances, these laws bar franchisors from cancelling or
refusing to renew franchises except for "good cause. '27 In addition to
good cause requirements for termination or nonrenewal, many other
subjects are governed by these franchise relationship statutes.28
regulation pursuant to this statute); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 684.2-684.3 (McKinney 1984); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 51-19-04.1 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28-4(b) (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-5A-12
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.030(4)(b)(i) (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 553.22 (West 1989).
26. Of course, legislation is not always a prerequisite to correcting alleged franchising abuses.
The law of misrepresentation certainly remains quite important. Moreover, in a few cases, courts
have used the common law to declare unlawful a termination or other franchisor behavior that
may have been unfair but not actually fraudulent. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402,
307 A.2d 598 (1973) (New Jersey Supreme Court finding that, despite contractual language to the
contrary, public policy in effect created a "good cause" requirement for terminations, and that
there was an implied covenant of lease renewability for a gasoline dealer who rented the station
premises from his franchisor, Shell), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978) (imposing good faith obligations relating to
nonrenewals); see also Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying good
faith principles so that franchisee-dealer was not deprived of its contractual "bargain"); Photovest
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that franchisor's predatory conduct
violated both antitrust laws and a common-law duty of good faith); deTreville v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that equity limits a contractual right to terminate at
will). The substantial expansion of law in this field, however, has its roots in legislation, not judi-
cial fiat.
27. Sixteen states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands now have
good cause requirements. These jurisdictions are: Arkansas, AR& STAT. ANN. § 4-72-204 (1987);
California, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 20,020-20,026 (West 1987); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31,101,
31,119, 31,125 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); Connecticut, CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f (West
1987); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552 (1974 & Supp. 1988); District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-1201 to 29-1203 (Supp. 1990); Hawaii, HAW. REv. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(H) (1988);
Illinois, Franchise Disclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ill. Laws, P.A. 85-551, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2,
para. 1719 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(7) (Burns 1989); Michi-
gan, MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 445.1527(c) (1989); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1990); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-404 (1987); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5
(West 1989); Puerto Rico, PAR. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 278-278b (Supp. 1988); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-51 (1986 & Supp. 1990) (prohibiting unfair or inequitable practices);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1503 (Supp. 1989); Virgin Islands, Vi CODE ANN. tit. 12A, §
132 (1982); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-564 (1985); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
19.100.180(2)(j) (1989); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.03 (West 1989) ("Fair Dealership
Law"). Each of these good cause for cancellation or nonrenewal states has a registration or disclo-
sure statute with the exception of Arkansas, Delaware, New Jersey, and Tennessee. These four
states, however, do prohibit or restrict certain franchisor practices. See infra notes 28 and 38 and
accompanying text.
28. The areas covered by statute include, inter alia, franchise advertising, franchisee associa-
tions, the financial condition of prospective franchisors, repurchases of franchises or franchisee
property, minimum time limits for notices prior to franchise termination or nonrenewal, minimum
initial duration of franchise term, discriminatory treatment among franchisees, rebates from sup-
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State-by-state regulation of franchised operations can be costly and
confusing.29 Multistate franchised operations must run a gauntlet of va-
rious disclosure, registration, and practices requirements. Thus, compli-
ance creates much higher costs than would compliance under a uniform
system of laws. Historically, however, Congress and federal administra-
tive agencies have been quite cautious in promoting a uniform system.
In the 1960s franchising grew so rapidly that many referred to a
"franchise boom."30 Economic growth outpaced the development of a
legal theory to deal with the franchisor-franchisee relationship.31 De-
spite numerous hearings and proposals, however, nothing has emerged
from Congress.32 As for federal administrative law, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) failed to promulgate a trade regulation on franchis-
ing until October 21, 1979, after nearly a decade of proposals and hear-
ings.3 The rule, entitled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures,"3' 4 re-
quires the franchisor to disclose numerous items to prospective fran-
chisees, but it does not require registration.35 Disclosure can be made
pliers to franchisors, franchisee covenants not to compete, franchisee waivers of statutory rights,
franchisees' exclusive territories, franchise transfers by the franchisee, franchisee managerial per-
sonnel, purchase requirements imposed on franchisees, and the general performance standards re-
quired of franchisees. See supra note 27 and statutes cited therein. State statutes tend to prohibit
or restrict franchisor actions or franchisor-imposed contract terms concerning one or more (usually
many) of the above matters. Each state statute is unique; indeed, the differences between states
can be considerable. Each statute must be reviewed for the specific rules applicable within that
state-a task beyond the scope of this Article.
29. In addition to general franchise and business opportunities legislation, see supra note 22,
all states have statutes geared specifically toward certain industries. As of January 1990, 36 states,
the District of Columbia, and the United States had statutes pertaining to gasoline franchisee-
dealers. See, e.g., Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806, 2821-2824, 2841 (1988)). Likewise, at the start of 1990, all but
one state (Alaska) had a statute concerning motor vehicle dealerships. The federal law that covers
this subject is the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act, Pub. L. No. 84-1026, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988)). Farm equipment and alcoholic beverage sales have
been two other frequent topics for specialized franchise-dealership legislation by the states.
Thirty-eight states have laws about the former, and thirty-two about the latter.
30. See, e.g., H. KURSH, supra note 9.
31. P. ZEIDMAN, supra note 8, at A-1 & n.7; see also H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE
TRUSTING 31 (1969); C. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 24-25; Zeidman, Federal/State Franchise and
Dealership Laws, in P.L.I. CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE No. 589, DISTRmUTION & MARKETING 1988,
at 105, 162 (1988).
32. Congress held hearings as early as 1963, and many franchise bills have been introduced,
but ultimately were defeated. P. ZEIDMAN, supra note 8, at A-1 & nn.11-12. Indeed, the only federal
enactments concern specific industries-gasoline (Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2801-2806, 2821-2824, 2841 (1988) (enacted in 1978)) and car dealerships (Automobile Dealers
Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988) (enacted in 1956))-and not franchising generally.
33. These regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
rulemaking authority under 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1988).
34. 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-436.3 (1990). This regulation is referred to popularly as the FTC Rule.
35. Id. The required disclosures concern, inter alia, the following: Franchisor trademarks and
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via a format prescribed by the FTC or by use of the comprehensive
twenty-three-item Uniform Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines
(UFOC).36
Compared with the numerous state enactments during the 1970s,
there has been relatively little new state legislation since the promulga-
tion of the FTC Rule. Indeed, some franchisors and commentators have
opined that the FTC Rule has eliminated the need for state regula-
tion. 7 The fact remains, however, that the FTC neither regulates
franchising practices nor requires registration, the two key aspects of
numerous state regulatory schemes. Many franchising problems arise
during the relationship, not just at its formation. Moreover, while dis-
closure is a fundamental step toward providing some information to
prospective franchisees, only franchisor registration provides for public
exposure and gives authorities the chance to examine franchisor infor-
mation to ensure that it meets the disclosure standards.
Franchising law remains a hodgepodge of disclosure formats, regis-
tration requirements, and regulation of actual practices.3 " It is therefore
an area of law in need of reform.
C. The Proposed Uniform Act and the Potential Amendment of the
FTC Rule
The Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act (the Uni-
form Act) was adopted in August 1987 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and subsequently was sup-
service marks, business experience, criminal and civil liabilities, bankruptcies, and audited balance
sheets; franchisee payments, financing, training, and suppliers; site selection; franchise operation,
termination, modification, repurchase, and assignment; total number of franchises and company-
owned outlets; and the number of outlets terminated, not renewed, or reacquired.
36. The UFOC was adopted on September 2, 1975, by the Midwest Securities Commissioners
Association, now the North American Securities Administrators Association. The FTC acknowl-
edged that compliance with the UFOC results in protection to prospective franchisees that is equal
to or greater than that provided by the rule. Final Guides to the Franchising and Business Oppor-
tunity Ventures Trade Regulation Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966, 49,970 (1979); see also Statement of
Basis and Purpose Relating to Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising
and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621, 59,722-23 (1978).
37. See, e.g., Downs, Franchise Regulation: Comprehensive State Regulation Now Unneces-
sary, 49 UMKC L. REv. 292 (1981).
38. Because of the FTC Rule, limited disclosure is required in all 50 states. For those states
that have franchise statutes providing greater franchisee protections than those under the FTC
Rule, there is no federal preemption of those protections. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.3 note 2 (1990); P.
ZEmMAN, supra note 8, at A-21 to A-22. With the UFOC alternative, individual state alterations to
the UFOC disclosure, and occasional preemption by the FTC Rule of some less protective state
disclosure formats, there is no uniformity even with respect to franchising disclosure.
Particular state (or territory) laws fall into six broad categories, listed in the table on page
1567 on a continuum ranging from the least to the most regulatory requirements.
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ported by the American Bar Association House of Delegates. 9 The Uni-
form Act underwent numerous revisions prior to adoption and
continues to face harsh criticism from many commentators, franchisors,
franchisees, and regulators. Even many of the Uniform Act's propo-
nents acknowledge that, "[a]bsent further federal intervention, uni-
formity is a mythical goal."'40 Supporters concede that varying results
should be anticipated because of the different political situations in
each state.41 Indeed, in many states the Uniform Act is unlikely to be
enacted in any form whatsoever. It faces formidable opposition from
the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA),42
the very group responsible for UFOC.43 The Uniform Act, thus, seems
quite likely to join numerous other uniform acts rejected by state
legislatures.4
39. The House of Delegates passed a resolution on February 9, 1988. 15A G. GLICKMAN, supra
note 19, § 13.0411A], at 13-201; see also Marcotte, Moss & Hengstler, ABA Passes AIDS Resolu-
tions: Action Taken on INF Treaty, Amnesty for Aliens, A-B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1988, at 141, 142.
40. Barkoff, Walking the Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act to and
Through the State Legislatures, 7 FRANCHISE L.J., Winter 1988, at 7, 8. One commentator wrote,
"While the Uniform Act received intense scrutiny during its fabrication, its many compromises
engendered opposition from virtually every quarter. Therefore it has no constituency to advocate
its enactment, and its reception to date in the state legislatures has been uniformly negative."
Selden, Public Regulation of Franchising: Choking the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs?, 9
FRANCHISE L.J., Fall 1989, at 1.
41. Barkoff, supra note 40, at 7-8; see also UNIFORM FRANCHISE AND BusiNEss OPPORTUNITIES
ACT, 7A U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1990) (listing no adopting jurisdictions through the end of 1989, for the
Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act); Gurnick & Zaid, Highlights of the Eleventh
Annual Forum on Franchising, 8 FRANCHISE L.J., Winter 1989, at 7 (noting the Oct. 7, 1988, pre-
diction of H. Brat Lowell, former editor of the Franchise Law Journal, that the Uniform Franchise
and Business Opportunities Act will be adopted by few, if any, states). See generally Selden, supra
note 40.
42. See H. BROWN, supra note 1, at 6-32 n.1; see also Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH), No. 91, at
5 (Oct. 20, 1987). A NASAA committee since has issued its own proposed Model Franchise Invest-
ment Act. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH), No. 112 (Aug. 3, 1989) (original draft); Business Franchise
Guide (CCH), No. 125, Part II (June 1990) (revised draft for public comment); Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 5 3700, at 4775 (1990) (briefly discussing the Model Act). The first draft, released on
July 17, 1989, and-to a somewhat lesser extent-the revised draft issued June 15, 1990, are ori-
ented much more toward a full administrative overview of franchisor disclosure documents than is
the Uniform Act. This Model Act is still in an embryonic stage, however, and has not received
nearly the scrutiny garnered by the Uniform Act and the recent FTC proposal. See infra notes 45-
48 and accompanying text. Indeed, NASAA has been criticized severely for allegedly formulating
its first draft without telling the franchising community or the FTC of its plans. This "secrecy" is
all the more remarkable given the extremely active posture NASAA has taken with respect to both
the Uniform Act and FTC proposals. See Fox & Hoppenfeld, A Review of NASAA's Model
Franchise Investment Act, 9 FRANCHISE L.J., Fall 1989, at 7.
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. See Shanker, The American Experience on Harmonization (Uniformity) of State Laws,
12 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 433, 436 (1987) (noting that only two uniform acts proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) have been adopted in every
state, while 16 have been adopted by none, and that about 75% of proposed acts have been en-
acted by less than half of the states). According to DIRECTORY OF UNIFORM ACTS DR'rED BY THE
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As for recent federal efforts, on February 16, 1989, the FTC pro-
posed amending the portion of the FTC Rule that covers earnings
claims and the preemption of state laws." The proposal did not call for
federal registration or prohibitions on certain supposedly unfair
franchisor practices.4" Under the amendment, the FTC Rule would re-
main just a disclosure rule: while perhaps the FTC might someday con-
sider preempting all state laws, the proposed amendments, at most, call
for preemption of all state disclosure requirements, not preemption of
all state laws related to franchising.47 Accordingly, even if the FTC
promulgates the proposed changes, state prohibition or restriction of
franchisor practices during the course of the franchising relationship
will be preempted only if they directly conflict with federal disclosure
requirements."
D. The Probable Continuation of Diverse Regulation
Few people would argue that the present, confusing set of state
laws creates a satisfactory regulatory environment. Franchisors and
NCCUSL & RECOMMENDED FOR ADOPTION IN ALL STATES, U.L.A. III (Supp. 1990), there are now
more than 160 such proposed laws.
45. The Rule's sections on earnings claims and preemption are found at 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1
(b)-(e) (1990) and 16 C.F.R. § 436.3 note 2 (1990), respectively. The FTC proposal is found at 54
Fed. Reg. 7041 (1989).
46. 54 Fed. Reg. 7041-45; Lowell, The Preemption Mirage, 8 FRANCHISE L.J., Spring 1989, at
1, 23; Brown, FTC Proposes Limiting State Franchise Rules, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, § 2, at 1,
col. 4. Franchisee groups and state regulators, however, oppose a preemption proposal that might
eliminate extra franchisee protections under state disclosure laws.
47. See 54 Fed. Reg. 7041-45. The preemption provision presently states that the Rule has
no effect on state or local laws or regulations "except to the extent that those laws or regulations
are inconsistent with any provision of [the Rule], and then only to the extent of the inconsis-
tency." 16 C.F.R. § 436.3 note 2 (1990). Furthermore, there is no inconsistency "if the protection
such [state or local] law or regulation affords any prospective franchisee is equal to or greater than
that provided by the Rule." Id.
As one would expect, NASAA opposes FTC preemption, and the leading franchisor organiza-
tion, the International Franchise Association, supports it. Kaufmann & Morton, Recent Judicial
and Regulatory Developments, in P.L.I. COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE No. 525, FRANCHISING 1990.
BUSINESS STRATEGIES & COMPLIANCE ISSUES 105, 126 (1990).
48. Telephone interviews with Craig Tregillus, Franchise Rule Coordinator, Federal Trade
Commission (July 10, 1989 and Sept. 24, 1990); see 54 Fed. Reg. 7041-45 (showing that the propo-
sal focuses on FTC and state disclosure requirements and, to a lesser extent, state registration
laws); see also Brown, ABA Likely to Back FTC Franchise Plan, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1989, § 2, at
1, col. 2 (noting that the comments of the American Bar Association's Section of Antitrust Law are
expected to support preemption, but only insofar as it concerns disclosure and, in a few states, the
regulatory review process required before franchises can be sold); Brown, supra note 46, § 2, at 1,
col. 4 (stating that most franchise lawyers believe that political pressure from states and franchis-
ees will prevent the FTC from preempting state laws entirely, and that the lawyers question the
FTC's authority to preempt state regulations without congressional approval); Lowell, supra note
46, at 23 (stating that the FTC's notice of proposed rulemaking does not appear to contemplate
preemption of relationship laws).
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franchisees alike agree that it is inefficient and costly for franchising
regulation to vary so much from state to state. Neither franchisors nor
franchisees, however, value uniformity if it comes at the expense of
what they consider generally more favorable, though diverse, state laws.
This conclusion is demonstrated empirically by franchisor and fran-
chisee opposition to the Uniform Act and their vehement objections to
FTC proposals for change. For advocates and opponents, fear of an un-
certain, perhaps substantively worse, franchising law exceeds the desire
to refashion what has been called "a crazy quilt" of disclosure and reg-
istration statutes.49
III. FRANCHISEES' RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION
A. Constitutional Law
In their collective activities, franchisees generally receive no more
legal protection than do other businesspersons acting through trade as-
sociations.50 Franchisees need more protection because they depend on
a franchisor who will not always act in their best interest. There is, of
course, a constitutional right of association that may provide a legal
mechanism for protecting franchisee rights.51 In several cases, the Su-
49. Brown, supra note 46, § 2, at 1, col. 4; see also R. Barkoff, Franchise Sales Regulation: A
Revisionist's Approach, Remarks at the ABA's Fifth Annual Forum on Franchising 8-9 (Nov. 4,
1982) (referring to a "regulatory maze" with minimal benefits to the public). Mr. Barkoff con-
cluded, "Not only are there too many laws, but there is too much inconsistency in their adminis-
tration and interpretation, resulting from both subtle and obvious distinctions in state laws, and
administrative and judicial idiosyncrasies. As a result, without reform, franchising will continue to
be legally intensive-but unreasonably so." Id. at 40. Attorney Barkoff, however, listed seven inter-
est groups-franchisors, franchisees, state legislators, state franchise administrators, state securi-
ties laws administrators, the FTC, and Congress-each of which is predisposed against change,
"[like [a] street gang[] . . . out to protect its turf." Id. at 43. Eight years later, Barkoff's com-
ments still ring true. Indeed, the outlook for each of the three initiatives-the Uniform Act, the
FTC preemption proposal, and the NASAA Model Act, supra note 42-is bleak. See Selden, supra
note 40, at 1, 18.
50. H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 10.08[5][a], at 10-100; Brown, Collective Bargaining for Fran-
chisees, 177 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1977, at 5, col. 2; see also G. WEBsTER, THE LAW OF AssocIATIONS §
17.07[1] (1990).
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition for a redress of
grievances"). The entire first amendment applies to the states, not just Congress, via its incorpora-
tion into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (prohibiting any establishment of religion);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (upholding the free exercise of religion); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (affirming freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (discussing freedom of the press); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (discussing
freedom of speech); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (discussing freedom of speech); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (discussing freedom of speech and the press); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
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preme Court has upheld these protections in the litigation context by
construing the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and as-
sembly to include the freedom to associate together for the purpose of
bringing disputes to court.52
The Supreme Court has not considered the constitutional guaran-
tee of free association to franchisees. A federal district court case, Mc-
Alpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc.,5" is notable because
it acknowledges this constitutional freedom of association in the con-
text of franchisees' rights. In McAlpine a dozen franchisees in the De-
troit area sued AAMCO, the largest franchisor of transmission repair
shops in the United States. When the franchisees filed suit they broke
away from AAMCO and formed Interstate Transmissions, a competing
transmission repair business. The lawsuit alleged that AAMCO's tie-in
and marketing practices breached the franchise agreements and vio-
lated antitrust laws. AAMCO counterclaimed with several allegations:
conspiracy, unfair competition, wrongful termination of the franchises,
interference with contractual relations, violation of antitrust laws, in-
fringement on AAMCO's trademark, and misappropriation of the
AAMCO merchandising system.54
The district court55 concluded that the dispute arose from the very
success of the AAMCO franchises. Initially, the franchisees' bene-
fits-profit incentives, reduced risk of failure, and independence greater
than that of employees-made the arrangement seem reasonable. As
the franchises became successful, however, the system began to appear
"burdensome." 6  Having learned the trade by operating under
AAMCO's business format, the franchisees were eager to become inde-
pendent and free themselves of restrictive franchise fees and royalty
payments.5"
The court was not sympathetic to the franchisees' second thoughts
52. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers
v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
53. 461 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
54. Id. at 1232, 1253, 1255, 1259, 1269, 1273.
55. Federal District Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr., presided over the case. Judge Guy since has
been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, effective Oct. 17, 1985.
56. McAlpine, 461 F. Supp. at 1239.
57. In the words of Judge Guy.
The franchisee whose hard work has enabled him to carve out a niche of profitability comes
to regard the payment of franchise fees as restricting that profitability. The franchisee who
has learned a system and has reaped its benefits wonders if his new-found knowledge of the
trade could enable him to prosper to a greater degree as an independent. Status, success,
name, and product all seem brighter to an independent businessman or as franchisee under
different terms.
Id.
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about their relationship with AAMCO, nor was it receptive to the fran-
chisees' claims. It ruled against all but one of the contentions raised in
the case: it found the franchisees liable for wrongful termination of the
franchise agreements.58
The court, however, did speak favorably of franchisee rights gener-
ally, recognizing the franchisees' first amendment right to assemble. 59
The court quoted the 1974 version of the franchisee freedom of associa-
tion provision found in Michigan's Franchise Investment Law.60 In lan-
guage that accords to franchising the same unfair balance of power
concerns prevalent in an employment relationship (concerns that led to
labor law protections), the court then stated:
One of the traditional control mechanisms of a franchisor has been to keep its fran-
chisees disorganized. Franchisees, by necessity, must have access to the franchise
group in order to act together to deal with common problems, whether those
problems be the oppressiveness of the franchisor or some less momentous concern.
The fact that a contract might have been breached as a direct result of franchisee
organization means nothing more than that the franchisor would have a cause of
action for breach of contract. 1
This, according to the court, would not result necessarily in a tortious
conspiracy, unfair competition, antitrust violations, or an interference
with contractual relations.6 2
Thus, the court found nothing actionable in the McAlpine fran-
58. Id. at 1253. This was the franchisor's breach of contract claim. The court found no anti-
trust violations by either side; no breach of contract by AAMCO; and no unfair competition, con-
spiracy, interference with contractual relations, trademark infringement, or misappropriation by
the franchisees.
59. The court stated:
Franchisees, like all other persons in the United States, enjoy the right pursuant to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution to assemble, subject only to those exceptions
specifically provided for by statute. Although a franchisee cannot combine with a competitor
to fix prices, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for example, franchisee gatherings, and joint activities which do
not violate the law cannot, standing alone, be actionable.
Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).
60. Id. The law is found at MxcH. ComP. LAWS §§ 445.1501-445.1546 (1989). At the time of the
McAlpine decision in 1978, the statute forbade any franchisor from "restrict[ing] the right of a
franchisee to join an association of franchisees, or requirfing] a franchisee to join an association."
McH. CoMp. LAWS § 445.1527 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). The emphasized portion effectively
was deleted, not just rewritten, in a 1984 amendment to the Michigan Franchise Investment Law.
The section now declares "void and unenforceable" any provision in "any documents relating to a
franchise" that contains "[a] prohibition on the right of a franchisee to join an association of fran-
chisees." MICH. Compu. LAWS § 445.1527(a) (1989).
State statutes providing franchisees with a right of association are discussed infra, Part HI(C).
The proposed uniform law is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 74-83, 87-90.
61. McAlpine, 461 F. Supp. at 1273-74. The quotation's first two sentences, along with Mich-
igan's freedom of association provision, see supra note 60, and comparable New Jersey and Wash-
ington statutes, see infra notes 99-101, 103, are cited in Brief for Petitioner at 29, National Muffler
Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) (No. 77-1172).
62. McAlpine, 461 F. Supp. at 1274.
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chisees' secret meetings and in their cautioning one another not to dis-
cuss matters outside of these meetings. 3 While one should not
overemphasize the court's language and its decision with respect to
franchisee association rights, 4 the case ultimately may be important for
citing a franchisee right of association statute 5 and for placing a judi-
cial imprimatur on franchisee groups.6 ' In essence, the court appreci-
ated the franchisee associations' historical underpinnings and
interpreted the associations as serving some essential, lawful purposes.
Absent evidence of an illegitimate method or goal, the court was loath
to impinge on the natural development of franchisee associations.6 7 As
63. Id.
64. In McAlpine the court acknowledged that rights of association are limited by statutes
such as antitrust laws. Id. at 1273. Thus, they certainly are not coextensive with labor union rights
inasmuch as the unions are, when acting alone, exempt from antitrust law coverage. 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1982). See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
65. This type of reference was a first. Since McAlpine only one other reported case has in-
voked franchisees' statutory rights of association. In Ricky Smith Pontiac v. Subaru of New Eng-
land, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 400, 440 N.E.2d 29, 33, appeal denied, 441 N.E.2d 260 (1982), Subaru
franchisee Ricky Smith Pontiac (Smith) sued its franchisor, Subaru of New England (SNE), after
the franchisor awarded a new, competing franchise about 10 miles from Smith's site. The defend-
ant counterclaimed that Smith breached the franchise agreement and conspired with other Subaru
dealers to prevent SNE from granting additional franchises. Id. at 398-400, 440 N.E.2d at 33-35.
SNE's charge of antitrust violations (the alleged conspiracy) focused on Smith's participation
in establishing and running the New England Subaru Dealers' Council, Inc. (the Council). As de-
scribed by the court:
In essence, the Council's members pooled resources to gather information about SNE's busi-
ness practices, to obtain legal counsel for advice on practical ways to correct those difficulties,
and to support (by financial assistance and the offer of relevant documentary evidence and
oral testimony) litigation brought by members against SNE for claimed violations of State
and Federal automobile dealer protection statutes.
Id. at 420, 440 N.E.2d at 45. Both the trial and appeals courts found no antitrust violations, hold-
ing that "a mere showing of close relations or frequent meetings" was grossly insufficient. Id. at
419, 440 N.E.2d at 45. Without more substantial proof, "an association of automobile dealers han-
dling the same line make, formed for the purposes of processing mutual grievances against their
common franchisor, and safeguarding market areas defined and entrusted to the dealers by State
statute, does not violate the antitrust laws." Id. at 419-20, 440 N.E.2d at 45.
Although making no reference to McAlpine or the Constitution, the Massachusetts appellate
decision does note the trial court's finding that "the Council was a prototype of the sort contem-
plated by" a section in the Massachusetts statute regulating business practices between motor
vehicle manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. Id. at 419, 440 N.E.2d at 44. MAss. GEN. L. ch.
93B, § 10 (1985) states that "[e]very franchisee shall have the right of free association with other
franchisees for any lawful purpose." For further discussion of state right of association statutes, see
infra Part Im(C).
66. Presently, McAlpine has only potential significance. The decision has been cited in a few
texts or articles. See, e.g., H. BROwN, supra note 1, at 10-103 nn.28-29, 12-60 n.20, 12-61 nn.23-24;
15 G. GLICKMAN, supra note 19, § 9A.02[2], at 9A-16 to 9A-17; Rudnick, supra note 1, at 12 &
nn.14-15 (discussing issues other than rights of association). The franchisee association portion of
the opinion, however, has yet to become part of a body of case law; instead, it still stands alone.
67. Finding nothing objectionable with the meetings themselves, the court stated:
The plaintiffs did not commence their secret meetings in September, 1973, with the objective
of conspiracy to break away from AAMCO. The meetings were begun in order to discuss the
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it stands, however, McAlpine remains the only reported case discussing
franchisee associations and declaring a constitutional right of
association. 8
B. Federal Franchising Laws and the Proposed Uniform Act
No federal statutory or administrative law expresses a franchisee's
right to associate with other franchisees. The FTC Rule 9 speaks of dis-
closures to prospective franchisees, but not of practices between
franchisors and existing franchisees. Moreover, the two federal statutes
specifically geared toward franchising also overlook franchisee associa-
tions. The Automobile Dealers Franchise Act7" requires that automobile
manufacturers-franchisors act in good faith when performing the terms
of a franchise, terminating a franchise, or refusing to renew a
franchise.71 Although couched in more specific language than the auto-
mobile dealers statute, the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 72 per-
mits gas station franchisors to terminate franchises only if a franchisee
fails to make a good faith effort in carrying out provisions of the
franchise agreement, or if a franchisee does not comply with a reasona-
ble, materially significant provision in the franchise agreement. 73 Thus,
in contrast to the FTC Rule, these two Acts govern franchising prac-
tices beyond just disclosure. The Acts, however, never even mention
rights of association.
Article II of the proposed Uniform Act,74 entitled "General Stan-
franchisees' concern over AAMCO's proposed marketing plan of placing more AAMCO
franchises in the Detroit area.. . .Separation from AAMCO was discussed as a last resort,
and plans were subsequently drawn only in the event that such a contingency might occur.
Not until November 20, 1973, at the last meeting the plaintiffs would hold as AAMCO fran-
chisees, did the franchisees vote to terminate their Franchise Agreements .... Accordingly,
those meetings, begun as a lawful vehicle for discussing legitimate business concerns, cannot
rise to the level of a tortious conspiracy particularly in light of the protections afforded by the
First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
McAlpine, 461 F. Supp. at 1274. Ironically, just two years after the McAlpine decision, the W.H.
McAlpine Company, apparently formed by one of the AAMCO breakaway franchisees, became
ensnarled in litigation over a covenant not to compete with its new franchisor, Interstate Auto-
matic Transmissions Company, Inc. In fact, Interstate was formed by the very breakaway franchis-
ees whose departure prompted the McAlpine-AAMCO lawsuit. See generally Interstate Automatic
Transmissions Co. v. W.H. McAlpine Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,538 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
68. Other cases have dealt with franchisee collective activities. A notable example is New
York v. Carvel Corp., 84 A.D.2d 727, 448 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 1981), discussed infra at notes 85-
86 and accompanying text.
69. The Rule is discussed supra at notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1988).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806, 2821-2824, 2841 (1988).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2) (1988). Also, the Act limits nonrenewal of franchises under 15
U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3) (1988).
74. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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dards of Conduct," has just two sections. Section 201 imposes a duty of
good faith on both franchisors and franchisees. Section 202, entitled
"Right of Free Association," states that "[a] party to a franchise or bus-
iness opportunity has a right to form or join a trade or other lawful
association whose purposes are related to the business of the franchise
or business opportunity. 7 5 The comment to Section 202 notes that
franchisees "may not be penalized" for associating with "other mem-
bers of the same system or others similarly situated [in order] to ad-
vance their common business interests. '7 6 The comment also notes that
a right of free association "does not insulate conduct that is anticompe-
titive,"' 7 nor does it protect actions harmful to the goodwill of a trade-
mark used in the franchise.78 Perhaps the comment most undermines
the significance of free association by stating that "it does not create
independent substantive contractual rights or a duty to bargain.
7 9
Although the proposed Uniform Act appears unlikely to be adopted
by most states,80 it may influence future state legislation. In one re-
spect, it augurs well for franchisees that the Uniform Act even has a
provision on the right of free association; most general franchise stat-
utes do not."' On the other liand, with its qualifier that the association's
purposes are to be "related to the business of the franchise, 82 the pro-
posed section may be interpreted more narrowly than existing state
statutes containing no such qualifier. Additionally, by eliminating any
duty to bargain, which may well be the centerpiece of labor relations
law and is certainly a prerequisite to most collective bargaining, the
comment to Section 202, if accepted by courts, would ensure that
franchisors retain the right to ignore completely their franchisee as-
sociations. The inability of franchisee associations to invoke a duty to
bargain collectively, coupled with the lack of independent substantive
contractual rights, limits the usefulness of associations,83 and suggests
75. UNiFORM AcT, supra note 1, §§ 201-202, at 4665-67.
76. Id. § 202 comment, at 4667.
77. Id. The § 202 comment about anticompetitive conduct is a point already established in
antitrust and labor law cases, which indicate that franchisee groups have no labor law exemption.
See infra Part VI; see also infra note 211.
78. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 1, § 202 comment, at 4667.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
81. See infra Part II(C)(1) & (2). Only nine states have a general franchisee right of associa-
tion statute or regulation. If, however, one adds the other states with right of association provisions
covering just one industry (e.g., automobile dealerships or gas stations), the total comes to over
half of the states. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
82. See supra text accompanying note 75.
83. This also may be the case with the Section's own language on "purposes. . . related to
the business of the franchise." UNIFORM AcT, supra note 1, § 202, at 4665-67; see supra text ac-
companying note 75.
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that Section 202 simply may recognize a franchisee right to associate
without granting franchisees the power to use that right effectively.
The litany of overreaching franchisor practices84 demonstrates that
strikingly different legal and practical ramifications arise from the dif-
ference in stating, and the difference in interpreting, a right of associa-
tion statute. For example, in New York v. Carvel Corp.85 New York
brought a state antitrust action against the franchisor for invading and
disrupting lawful meetings held by franchisees who were attempting to
gather support for franchise legislation pending in the United States
Congress. 6 In effect, Carvel tried its best to "bust" a budding fran-
chisee "union."
New York has no right of association statute. Even if it were to
adopt the Uniform Act, 7 would Section 202 protect franchisees-as in
Carvel-who forcibly expelled the franchisor's attorney from a fran-
chisee meeting? Perhaps, as in Carvel, a franchisor's allegedly unlawful
behavior of resisting an association could be a basis for a franchisee
lawsuit. An awkward or weakly worded franchisee association statute,
however, easily could be diluted further by interpretations that view the
franchisee group more as an advisory council s than as an independent
association. 9 Unless the franchisees have full control in determining
84. For a broad array of these practices, see, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d
704 (7th Cir. 1979) (involving a photography franchisor that, having decided to convert its
franchised system to a vertically integrated operation, saturated franchisees' territories with com-
pany-owned outlets and otherwise violated a common-law obligation of good faith by engaging in
"dirty tricks" designed to drive its franchisees out of business), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980);
H. BROWN, supra note 1, at 4-2 to 4-38 (providing numerous examples); S. LUXENBERG, supra note
4, at 252-53, 263-66; and B. WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 119-20, 187-89 (discussing extra charges
unrelated to benefits supposedly to be conferred upon franchisees; charges for every conceivable
franchisor service, even rudimentary information and trouble-shooting; and excessive prices for
merchandise and services sold to franchisees). Luxenberg gives several specific examples of over-
reaching franchisor practices. One involves Carvel ice cream franchisees who paid royalties to the
franchisor based on volume purchased. Carvel initiated a "Buy One, Get One Free" advertising
campaign, which in effect forced franchisees to buy a product and then give some away, while
Carvel received increased royalties because of higher overall volume. S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4,
at 252-53. Another example discusses a franchisor who increased the number of franchised units in
an area to raise overall sales, which reduced or eliminated individual franchisees' profits. Id. at
263. Luxenberg also discusses problems with the Arthur Treacher's chain, and allegedly huge
markups by Howard Johnson on products that it forced its franchisees to buy. Id. at 264-66.
85. 84 A.D.2d 727, 448 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 1981).
86. Id. at 728, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
87. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
88. Thus, the franchisee group would be tied legally to the system as a whole, not just the
franchisees.
89. See infra Part V(A).
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their organization's purposes 0 and membership, 91 many subjects such
as lobbying and the collective filing of complaints with state regulatory
authorities may be deemed outside the realm of legitimate associational
activity. This is true particularly if franchisee control is viewed by
franchisors and courts as contrary to the interests of the franchised sys-
tem as a whole.92
C. State Law
1. General Statutes
Franchisee right of association statutes can be found in the general
90. Such purposes have included lobbying, filing complaints with federal and state regulatory
authorities, and financing lawsuits. See, e.g., 15 G. GLICKMAN, supra note 19, § 9A.01[3], at 9A-9
(noting that after PepsiCo bottling franchisees failed to obtain FTC recognition of their stake in
an FTC proceeding against soft drink syrup manufacturers, they succeeded in lobbying Congress
to remove FTC jurisdiction); id. § 9A.02[2], at 9A-12 nn.11-12 (remarking that the Petroleum Mar-
keting Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806, 2821-2824, 2841 (1988), the Automobile Dealers
Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988), and state laws protecting automobile dealers and
farm equipment dealers mainly resulted from organized dealer lobbying); Strauss, Board Previews
New Orleans and Finds It Exciting, AvANTi, THE VOICE OF THE 7-ELEVEN FRANCHISEES, July-Aug.
1984, at 22 (stating that the National Coalition of Associations of 7-Eleven Franchisees would act
as an opposing lobby in all states where the franchisor, Southland Corporation, "continues to sup-
port legislation detrimental to the welfare of franchisees and franchising"; also noting the National
Coalition's unanimous support of the New York 7-Eleven Franchise Owners Association's lobbying
on behalf of a New York Fair Franchise Bill). Franchisees may not have a right to such control
under § 202 of the Uniform Act. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
91. For example, franchise groups can exclude all franchisor-owned outlets and franchisor
representatives. See T. Fine & G. Aaron, Franchisee Trade Associations Workshop Outline, Re-
marks at the ABA's Seventh Annual Forum on Franchising 5 (1984) (noting that the International
Pizza Hut Franchise Holders Association, originally a "functional arm" of the franchisor, was re-
formed as an organization completely independent of Pizza Hut, Inc. and the company-owned
restaurants; there remained no franchisor ownership interests or representatives); Fine, Adopt
These Principles for Business Success, AVANTi, supra note 90, at 38, 40 (reporting on the need for
the National Coalition of Associations of 7-Eleven Franchisees to maintain an independent trade
association that is controlled and financed solely by franchisees, and opining that nonindependent
advisory councils may "go the way of the dinosaurs"); cf. Rodgers, The Perspective of In-House
Council, in P.L. COMMERCIAL LAw & PRACTICE No. 412, FRANCHISING 1987: BusiNEss STRATEGIES &
LEGAL COMPLIANCE 401, 495 (1987) (stating that, despite franchisees' objections, franchisor South-
land Corporation continues to require that one of its lawyers be present at franchisee advisory
council meetings).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91. This result would occur if courts looked at
the franchisor as well as any other interested party, not just franchisees. But see Fine, supra note
91, at 40, which states:
Franchisors that have dealt with truly independent trade associations of franchisees (such as
Holiday Inn, Pizza Hut, Midas Muffler, Hertz, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Southland) have
found that they obtain the best ideas and solutions from such independent trade groups. This
is true even though the discussion and negotiations can be much more difficult tha[n] in the
case of nonindependent groups.
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franchising laws of Arkansas, 93 California,94 Hawaii,95 Illinois,9 6 Michi-
gan, s7 Nebraska,9 s New Jersey,9 and Washington. 00 The statutes them-
selves are fairly straightforward and broad enough to cover a wide range
of practices. In both Nebraska and New Jersey, it is a violation for any
franchisor "[t]o prohibit directly or indirectly the right of free associa-
tion among franchisees for any lawful purpose."''1 1 Arkansas's right of
association statute is substantially the same. 02 Hawaii's statute is
modeled after the Washington act, which prohibits the franchisor from
"[r]estrict[ing] or inhibit[ing] the right of the franchisees to join an as-
sociation of franchisees.' 0 3 The three other state statutes are phrased
somewhat differently. Michigan specifically addresses infringement on
franchisee associational rights in franchise documents,0 and the Cali-
fornia and Illinois statutes both talk of, inter alia, the franchisees' right
to join trade associations. 0 5 Aside from McAlpine v. AAMCO Auto-
93. Arkansas Franchise Practices Act (1977), ARu STAT. ANN. § 4-72-206(2) (1987).
94. California Franchise Investment Law (1970), CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,220 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1990).
95. Hawaii Franchise Investment Law (1974), HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(A) (1988).
96. Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act of 1987, 1987 M. Laws, P.A. 85-551, § 17, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 1717 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
97. Michigan Franchise Investment Law (1974) (amended 1984), MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
445.1527(a) (1989).
98. Nebraska Franchise Practices Act (1978), NEB. RE V. STAT. § 87-406(2) (1987).
99. New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (1971), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(b) (West 1989).
100. Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act (1972), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.100.180(2)(a) (1989).
101. NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-406(2) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(b) (West 1989).
102. The only real difference with the Arkansas statute is in the placement of the words
"directly or indirectly." The Arkansas statute begins: "It shall be a violation of this chapter for any
franchisor, through any officer, agent, or employee, to engage directly or indirectly in any of the
following practices ... ." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-206 (1987).
103. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(a) (1989). The Hawaii statute, in pertinent part,
is similar, stating that "it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice or an unfair method of
competition for a franchisor or subfranchisor to ... [r]estrict the right of the franchisees to join
an association of franchisees." HAW. REv. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(A) (1988).
104. The statute reads in pertinent part: "Each of the following provisions is void and unen-
forceable if contained in any documents relating to a franchise: ... A prohibition on the right of a
franchisee to join an association of franchisees." MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 445.1527(a) (1989). A 1984
revision of the 1974 Michigan franchise law included an amendment to the right of association
statute. The original statute not only prohibited restrictions on the franchisees' right to join an
association, but also forbade any requirement that franchisees must join an association. See McAl-
pine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1273 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see
also supra note 60.
105. A trade association includes business competitors among its members. G. WEBSTER,
supra note 50, § 15.03[3], at 15-22.1; OPEN-PRIcE TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, S. Doc. No. S276, 70th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (FTC 1969). While a system's franchisees may compete for business, the econom-
ically dependent and operationally monolithic franchisees of one franchisor are not typical, inde-
pendent business competitors. They are bound to follow an established set of private standards
more usual for wholly owned businesses than separate entities. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) (deciding against "business league" tax exemption for an
association made up exclusively of the franchisees from one franchisor).
California's statute labels it a civil violation for "any franchisor, directly or indirectly, through
any officer, agent or employee, to restrict or inhibit the right of franchisees to join a trade associa-
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matic Transmissions, Inc.,10 6 no reported cases have discussed or inter-
preted any of these general franchisee right of association statutes.
2. Regulations and Industry-Specific Statutes
Of the forty-two states without express right of association statutes
generally covering franchisees, only Minnesota has made such a law by
administrative regulation. 107 In effect, the rule reads the same as most
franchisee right of association statutes. No cases are reported. Even
though other state regulatory bodies have the power to enact a similar
regulation, given the passage of time since the creation of state regula-
tory powers, 0 8 such administrative rulemaking seems unlikely.
Many states, however, do include a franchisee freedom of associa-
tion provision'" in one or more of their industry-specific statutory
tion or to prohibit the right of free association among franchises for any lawful purpose." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31,220 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). The Illinois provision states: "It shall be an unfair
franchise practice and a violation of this Act for a franchisor to in any way restrict any franchisee
from joining or participating in any trade association." 1987 Ill. Laws, P.A. 85-551, § 17, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 1717 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
106. 461 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978). McAlpine is discussed supra, Part I1(A). See also
supra note 65 (discussing Ricky Smith Pontiac v. Subaru of New England, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396,
440 N.E.2d 29, appeal denied, 441 N.E.2d 260 (1982), a case that refers to a franchisee right of
association statute found in a Massachusetts motor vehicle distributor and dealer law).
107. The Minnesota franchise law has a section stating that no person "shall engage in any
unfair or inequitable practice in contravention of such rules as the commissioner [in charge of
regulating franchising] may adopt defining as to franchises the words 'unfair and inequitable."'
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14 (subd.1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990). Pursuant to that section, the Secur-
ities Division of the Minnesota Department of Commerce promulgated the following rule: "It shall
be 'unfair and inequitable' for any person to ... [r]estrict or inhibit, directly or indirectly, the free
association among franchisees for any lawful purpose." MINN. R. pt. 2860.4400 (S. Div. 1714) (1975)
(approved by Attorney General Jan. 10, 1975, and filed with Secretary of State and Commissioner
of Administration Jan. 13, 1975).
108. Most states' regulatory powers came into being in the 1970s with the enactment of
franchising or business opportunity laws. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,502 (West 1977) (1970
law); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-8(d) (1988) (1974 law); MICH. Com. LAWS § 445.1541 (1989) (1974
law); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28-13(C) (1989) (1973 law); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-5A-51, 37-5A-
54 (1986) (1974 law); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-572 (1989) (1972 law); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.100.250 (1989) (1972 law).
109. The provision usually includes the qualifying phrase, "for any lawful purpose." See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 8-20-10 (1988) (motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1981); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1554(1) (1987) (gasoline dealers) (enacted 1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-206(2) (1987) (enacted
1977); CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,220 (West Supp. 1990) (enacted 1977); CAL. VEH. CODE § 11,713.3(n)
(West 1987) (motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133cc(7) (West
1987) (motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1331(f)(2) (West 1987)
(petroleum product franchisees) (enacted 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4913(b)(6) (Supp. 1988)
(motor vehicle franchisees) (enacted 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 563.022(5)(b)(10) (West Supp. 1990)
(beer manufacturers or distributors) (enacted 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-662(a)(8) (Supp. 1990)
(motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1983); IDAHO CODE § 49-1613(3)(f) (1988) (motor vehicle dealers)
(enacted 1988); 19 IMI. Laws, P.A. 81-43, § 10, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 760 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990) (motor vehicle franchisees) (enacted 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 190.070(2)(h)
(Michie 1989) (motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1180 (1980)
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schemes. Provisions can be found in twenty-seven states.11 Looking at
these laws by subject matter, we find the following: Nineteen of the
forty-nine states with motor vehicle dealership-franchise laws contain a
right of association statute;"' twelve of the thirty-six states with gaso-
line franchisee-dealer laws have right of association statutes;"' and of
the thirty-two states with statutes covering breweries, beer wholesalers
and suppliers, wineries, wine wholesalers, or other liquor distributors,
four have right of association provisions. 13 With the exception of one
(automobile dealers) (enacted 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 10 (West 1984) (motor vehi-
cle franchisees) (enacted 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80E.13(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (motor
vehicle dealers) (enacted 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.825 (11) (Vernon 1990) (motor vehicle fran-
chisees) (enacted 1980); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-406(2) (1987) (enacted 1978); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §
598.655(1) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989) (petroleum product wholesalers and gas station operators)
(enacted 1975 and amended 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-C(10) (1984) (motor vehicle fran-
chisees) (enacted 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(b) (West 1989) (enacted 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
20-305(21) (1989) (new motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1973 and amended 1983); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, § 202-4(2) (Purdon Supp. 1990) (lessee dealers of gasoline, petroleum products, and motor
vehicle accessories) (enacted 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-13-10 (1987) (malt beverage suppliers or
wholesalers) (enacted 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-10 (1982) (automobile dealers) (enacted 1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-17-114(c)(16) (1989) (motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1977); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-12-3(2) (1986) (gasoline dealers) (enacted 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4097(7) (1984 &
Supp. 1989) (new motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-118.59 (Supp. 1990)
(wineries or wine wholesalers) (enacted 1985 and amended 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-118.19 (1988)
(breweries or beer wholesalers) (enacted 1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.94.020(19) (1989) (motorcy-
cle dealers) (enacted 1985); W. VA. CODE § 47-11C-3(8) (1986) (petroleum product dealers) (en-
acted 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 31-16-108(c)(vi) (1989) (new motor vehicle dealers) (enacted 1988). Of
the eight states with general franchise statutes containing a franchisee right of association provi-
sion, four of them-Arkansas, California, Nebraska, and New Jersey-qualify that right with the
phrase, "for any lawful purpose," as does the Minnesota regulation in this area. See supra notes
101-02, 105, 107 and accompanying text.
110. These 27 states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The citations to most of the statutes are provided
supra at note 109. The remaining statutes are: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93E, § 6 (West 1984)
(gasoline dealers) (enacted 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 339-C(6) (1984) (gasoline dealers) (en-
acted 1974); O& REv. STAT. § 650.205(3) (1988) (motor fuel franchisees) (enacted 1987); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-55-6 (1987) (motor fuel dealers) (enacted 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-624 (1988)
(petroleum or related products dealers) (enacted 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4106 (1984) (gaso-
line dealers) (enacted 1975).
111. The states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina (for deal-
ers of new vehicles), Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont (for dealers of new vehicles), Washington
(for motorcycle dealers), and Wyoming (for dealers of new vehicles). For citations see supra note
109.
112. The states are Arizona, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Note the overlap: Six
states have provisions both as to motor vehicle dealer associations and gas station dealer associa-
tions. See supra note 111. For citations see supra notes 109 & 110.
113. The states are Florida (beer manufacturers or distributors), Minnesota (breweries, beer
wholesalers), Rhode Island (malt beverage suppliers and wholesalers), and Virginia (breweries,
wineries, and beer and wine wholesalers). For citations see supra note 109.
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Massachusetts case between an automobile dealer and the dealer's
franchisor, 1 4 no reported cases deal with these subject-specific fran-
chisee right of association statutes.
3. Enforcement of Right of Association Statutes
In most states the remedies for a violation of the franchisees' rights
of association are the same as those for other proscribed franchisor
practices. States usually provide a public cause of action for the state
attorney general and a private cause of action for aggrieved franchisees.
Of the eight states with general franchising statutes that include a right
of association provision, six permit franchisees to sue for injunctive re-
lief, damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and other costs."5 Enforce-
ment statutes rarely allow treble or punitive damages." 6
Many state statutes specifically mention that all other statutory
and common-law remedies remain available."' When one considers also
the typical statutory causes of action, which often provide broad reme-
dies, it is clear that both state and private enforcement measures are
accessible. The dearth of reported cases, therefore, must be attributable
to some other factor-perhaps lack of violations, franchisee ignorance
of the law, substantial litigation costs, reduced or demoralized state en-
forcement personnel, predominance of other franchisee and state en-
forcement concerns, or settlement of cases. Additionally, one must
remember the limited nature of the underlying substantive law:
franchisors have a negative duty to avoid interfering with membership,
114. Ricky Smith Pontiac v. Subaru of New England, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 440 N.E.2d 29,
appeal denied, 441 N.E.2d 260 (1982), discussed supra at note 65.
115. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-208(b) (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-9 (1988); 1987 Inl.
Laws, P.A. 85-551, § 26, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, parm. 1726 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (not pro-
viding for attorney's fees); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-409 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-10 (West 1989);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.190 (1989). California and Michigan provide only for actions by
state authorities. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,400 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§
445.1535, 445.1538 (1989).
For civil enforcement sections covering right of association statutes for specific industries (dis-
cussed supra at notes 109-13 and accompanying text), see ALA. CODE § 8-20-11 (1984); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10-1-623 to 10-1-626 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 12A (1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93E, § 7 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325B.08 (West 1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.835
(1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339-C(7)(I)(d) (1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 650.250 (1988); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 202-6 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-13-11 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
4099 (1984); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4107 (1984).
116. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-623(b) (1989) (awarding punitive damages for "aggra-
vated or continued multiple intentional violations"); HAw. REv. STAT. § 482E-9(c) (1988) (providing
court with discretion to treble the actual damages award); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.190(3)
(1989) (providing court with discretion to treble the actual damages award).
117. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,306 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-626
(1989); 1987 Il1. Laws, P.A. 85-551, § 28, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1212, para. 1728 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990); MicH. Comp. LAws § 445.1534 (1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.835 (1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 339-C(7)(H) (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.910 (1989).
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but no affirmative duty to communicate with the franchisee association.
Without the right to force such contacts, franchisees simply are left to
beg the franchisor for collective bargaining rights,"" recognition of fran-
chisee "unions," or other purely voluntary measures.
4. No Collective Bargaining Requirement
a. General Interpretations
Although courts have not ruled on these statutes, it is apparent
that freedom of association does not compel franchisors to deal with
franchisee associations. These statutes are not the equivalent of state
Wagner Acts for franchisees giving, for example, a right to collective
bargaining. Indeed, one commentator contended that the Washington
statute accomplishes very little because it "merely invalidates 'yellow
dog' provisions in franchise contracts."' 19
From the franchisors' viewpoint, avoidance of collective bargaining
is a prime advantage of franchising. In some cases, the driving force
behind the conversion of fully integrated, employee-operated businesses
to franchised operations is an attempt to prevent or remove the suppos-
edly harmful effects of unionization and thereby increase profits. 120 In-
deed, franchisors have been accused of using all of the same strong-arm
and disingenuous tactics employed by virulent "union busters.' 2' Most
established franchisors, as well as the International Franchise Associa-
tion (IFA), the primary trade association for franchisors, generally en-
courage cooperation with and respect for franchisee groups. There are,
however, limits: the IFA and most franchisors consider it a fundamental
axiom that franchisee organizations must never be accorded the collec-
tive bargaining status of a union."22
Unlike a union, a franchisee association generally cannot bind its
members. 23 Still, there may be a tendency by both franchisors and
118. See infra Part III(C)(4).
119. Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising: The Washington Experience, 48 WASH. L.
REv. 291, 371 (1973).
120. See, e.g., NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 313 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that "[a]s the
time of expiration of [the Company's collective bargaining agreement with the union] neared, the
Company took steps to change its method of operation in Los Angeles to that of the other cities, it
having been determined that the independent retailer method of doing business [franchising] was
more advantageous to the Company").
121. See Brown, Franchising: Fraud, Concealment, and Full Disclosure, 33 OHio ST. L.J.
517, 544 (1972) (duplicating language found in H. BROWN, supra note 1, at 4-34).
122. See infra notes 123-25, 159, 161, 164 and accompanying text.
123. Rodgers, supra note 91, at 502. As Attorney Rodgers states:
A franchisor should recognize that an association is composed of individual franchisee mem-
bers who have separate, and in some instances different, franchise agreements with the
franchisor. The franchisor should not forget the independent contractor nature of those fran-
chisees and should preserve a communication vehicle that allows for input of systemic issues
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franchisees to view the association as a labor union of sorts.124
Franchisor attorneys seek to counter this perception with the standard
refrain, "associations are not labor unions, do not represent the fran-
chisee members in that way, and the treatment of them like that could
harm the independent contractor status. '12 5
b. Specific Enactments
Among the original, but deleted, sections in a 1970 Massachusetts
bill12 6 were provisions that specifically would have given to automobile
dealers all of the collective bargaining rights and procedural protections
found in the Massachusetts Labor Relations Act.127 The following year
Massachusetts Senate Bill 110, which was intended to accord collective
bargaining powers to all franchisees, likewise failed to pass. In the ensu-
ing onslaught of franchising legislation throughout the country, during
which many states passed franchisee right of association statutes, 28
only New Hampshire and Vermont gave any type of collective bargain-
ing rights to their franchisees. 2 9
New Hampshire's law on gasoline dealers, enacted in 1974, prohib-
its suppliers from hindering, coercing, or threatening a dealer for the
purpose of preventing him from joining a dealer trade association. Deal-
ers can select bargaining agents who, in turn, can negotiate with suppli-
ers, and the suppliers must bargain in good faith with the agents.13 0
by, and communication to and from, all franchisees (even those who are not members of an
association).
Id. at 501-02.
124. M. Davis, Outline of Practical Considerations in Dealing with Franchisee Associations,
Remarks at the 18th Annual Legal Symposium of the International Franchise Association (IFA) 11
(May 6-7, 1985) (available from IFA, Washington, D.C.).
125. Id.
126. The enacted law is found in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B (1984 & Supp. 1990) and is
entitled "Regulation of Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors
and Dealers."
127. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §§ 1-12 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). The deleted collec-
tive bargaining sections of the auto dealers act are briefly discussed in Brown, A Bill of Rights for
Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 757, 811-12 (1971).
128. It is important to count not only the eight general state statutes discussed supra notes
93-105 and accompanying text, but also the many right of association statutes found in subject-
particular state franchising laws. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
129. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 339-C(6) (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4106 (1984). As
discussed infra notes 172 & 205, other nations also have decided against giving collective bargain-
ing rights to franchisees.
130. The statute provides in full:
No supplier shall hinder, coerce or threaten any dealer for the purpose of preventing him
from joining any trade association made up of dealers. Dealers shall have a right to select
bargaining agents to negotiate and deal with suppliers on matters having to do with their
supplier-dealer relationship. Suppliers shall be obliged to bargain in good faith with agents so
selected by the dealers. Such bargaining activity shall be pursued to the maximum extent
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Vermont's law operates similarly, 3 1 and both states expressly permit
dealers to bring actions for damages, including attorney's fees, resulting
from a violation of these dealer trade association laws.3 2 Once again,
however, no cases are reported. Additionally, there appears to have
been no administrative oversight of either provision.'33 Both legislative
permitted by law.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 339-C(6) (1984). The second sentence of the statute resembles a section
from the model law entitled "Franchising Fair Dealing Act," introduced in a number of states in
the 1970s. Brief for Petitioner at 28, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
(1979) (No. 77-1172). That section reads, "Franchisees shall have the right to association and to
select a collective bargaining agent of their own choosing to negotiate and deal with franchisors on
matters having to do with their franchise relationship." Id. at 28-29. Note that New Hampshire's
statute goes beyond this organizational right and mentions specifically the gasoline supplier's obli-
gation to bargain with the franchisees' representatives. Only Vermont, see infra note 131, and
Rhode Island have provisions even remotely resembling New Hampshire's or the model statute on
franchise fair dealings.
The Rhode Island statute, also on gasoline dealers, reads the same as New Hampshire's except
that the bargaining agents are "to negotiate and deal with suppliers on an individual basis." R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 5-55-6 (1987) (emphasis added). The distinction appears crucial. Rhode Island's law is
clearly intended not to provide collective bargaining rights. It matches the New Hampshire statute
word for word, but pointedly includes the additional phrase indicating that each bargaining agency
is for one person only.
No pertinent cases are reported in Rhode Island. For more on the history, interpretation, and
operation of the New Hampshire and Vermont statutes, see infra notes 131-36 and accompanying
text.
131. The Vermont statute on gasoline dealers states:
No supplier shall coerce or threaten any dealer for the purpose of preventing him from joining
any trade association made up of dealers. An individual dealer shall have a right to select a
representative to negotiate and deal with suppliers on matters having to do with his supplier-
dealer relationship. Suppliers shall be obliged to negotiate in good faith with the representa-
tive so selected by the dealer.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4106 (1984). Note that the language is in the singular form: "individual
dealer," "his supplier-dealer relationship." Unlike Rhode Island's statute, which speaks of individ-
ual negotiations, see supra note 130, perhaps the Vermont law permits individual dealers to desig-
nate one particular representative to act jointly on their behalf. The Vermont legislation does not
seem to contemplate such group behavior, but the Rhode Island statute appears, in fact, to pro-
scribe it. See supra note 130.
The Vermont statute, however, can be fully operational without ever reaching the issue of
collective bargaining. Indeed, as with the New Hampshire and Rhode Island laws, the state legisla-
ture in Vermont failed to adopt the model "Franchising Fair Dealing Act" terminology about a
collective bargaining agent. See supra note 130. For more on the history, interpretation, and oper-
ation of the Vermont and New Hampshire statutes, see infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
132. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 339-C(7)(I)(d), 339-C(7)(II) (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4107
(1984).
133. Telephone interviews with Paul Doran, paralegal, Consumer Protection Division, New
Hampshire Office of the Attorney General, and others at the New Hampshire Public Utilities Com-
mission, Division of Motor Vehicles, and Department of Agriculture, Concord, New Hampshire
(July 24, 1989 and Sept. 5, 1990); telephone interview with Daniel Bokan, clerk, Consumer Assis-
tance Program, Vermont Office of the Attorney General, Burlington, Vermont (Sept. 13, 1989);
telephone interview with Cynthia Buska, clerk, Vermont Public Service Board, Montpelier, Ver-
mont (Sept. 5, 1990); telephone interview with Jay Ashland, attorney, Consumer Fraud Division,
Vermont Office of the Attorney General, Burlington, Vermont (Sept. 5, 1990).
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history and subsequent application confirm that the New Hampshire
and Vermont statutes really are just right of association statutes, with
no emphasis placed on their potential collective bargaining
significance.13 4
As with other states' freedom of association provisions, the New
Hampshire and Vermont statutes either may be quietly accomplishing
their purposes'" or simply may have gotten lost amid more pressing
legal issues in dealer regulation and litigation. With no complaints be-
ing filed with state administrators and no published court decisions, the
New Hampshire and Vermont statutes furnish little legal guidance.
Practical guidance likewise is limited; despite the bargaining rights
granted by the two statutes, there has been absolutely no collective bar-
gaining.'38 If, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, our federal system
permits "the making of social experiments. . . in the insulated cham-
bers afforded by the several states"'137 (thus allowing a type of testing
program before undertaking what might prove to be a precipitous na-
134. The franchisees' chief advocate, attorney John D. Clifford, believes that the New Hamp-
shire provision was a response to one supplier's threat to terminate dealers who joined a trade
association. The response was directed toward freedom of association, not necessarily collective
negotiations. Telephone interviews with John D. Clifford, General Counsel, Tri-State Gasoline and
Automotive Dealers Association, Inc. (Tri-State) (trade association covering Maine, New Hamp-
shire, and Vermont) (Sept. 22, 1989 and Sept. 5, 1990). The language about bargaining agents in
both the New Hampshire and Vermont statutes was intended to proclaim a dealer association's
right to represent individual dealers with respect to individual, supplier-dealer problems. Id. The
actual practice has been for the dealer's own attorney to represent the dealer's interests. Id. That
attorney clearly could be an association-recommnended lawyer such as the association's own coun-
sel. Id.
135. This purpose is to protect the franchisees' right to form and maintain a franchisee asso-
ciation. Another purpose suggested by Attorney Clifford might be to prevent suppliers from claim-
ing that the dealers' trade association tortiously interfered with a supplier-dealer contract. Id.
136. No collective bargaining has occurred between any Maine, New Hampshire, or Vermont
gasoline dealers and their suppliers. Telephone interviews with James Connoly, President, Tri-
State (Sept. 22, 1989 and Sept. 5, 1990); telephone interviews with John D. Clifford, supra note
134. According to Clifford, each dealer has a distinct contract with the supplier, making it imprac-
tical even to try collective bargaining. Telephone interviews with John D. Clifford, supra note 134.
That individual contracts come up for renewal at different times would impede further any at-
tempt at collective action. Id. The gasoline dealers' regional trade association-Tri-State-and the
Service Station Dealers of America, their national association, merely serve as advisers and infor-
mation clearinghouses. Telephone interviews with James Connoly, supra. They do not act as bar-
gaining representatives. Id.; telephone interviews with John D. Clifford, supra note 134.
Rhode Island also has no gasoline dealer collective bargaining, nor any prospects thereof. Tele-
phone interview with Nathaniel J. Nazareth, Counsel to the Rhode Island Section of the Connecti-
cut-Rhode Island Gasoline Retailers and Garage Owners Association, Inc. (Sept. 5, 1990). Dealers
often are extremely independent. Even if they were willing to grant bargaining powers to a trade
association, any attempt at collective negotiations would have to surmount the practical difficulties
of distinct dealer contracts with different renewal dates. Id. In general, the state law on gasoline
franchises has "no teeth." Id. Rhode Island dealers and their attorneys tend to prefer the federal
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806, 2821-2824, 2841 (1988). Id.
137. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tionwide change), then meaningful results seem still to need a larger,
more active, scientific sample of potential franchisee "unions" than the
franchised gasoline dealers in two small states.
5. Legislative Trends
In the 1970s many states enacted laws to protect franchisees and
other persons who were offered certain business opportunities."58 Since
then, the pace of state legislation has slackened considerably. 139 With
little impetus for new state franchising laws in general, the likelihood of
states enacting a specialized measure on associational rights seems
bleak. It is highly improbable that a number of states now will under-
take that which none has done in the past decade: either enact a gen-
eral franchise relationship law including a franchisee right of
association provision, or add such a provision to an existing general
statutory scheme.
The FTC probably also has dampened the prospects for further as-
sociational rights legislation, albeit temporarily and unintentionally.
This dampening likely has occurred because further state substantive
laws about the franchise relationship can be held back for as long as the
FTC considers preempting or otherwise reducing state regulation of
franchisor disclosures. Many state administrators and franchisee groups
apparently believe it fundamental to fight disclosure law reductions or
outright preemption,140 and their time or resources may be insufficient
to push for action in other areas of franchising law.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: FRANCHISEE GROUP
MEASURES IN COURT, BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, OR THROUGH
ARBITRATION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' as well as many state
rules, permit class actions by franchisees against a franchisor. If suc-
cessful, these actions can force major systemic changes in a franchised
operation,'42 something most individual suits are far less likely to ac-
complish. Class actions, however, generally are expensive, often provoke
138. See supra Part H(B).
139. See supra text accompanying note 37.
140. See supra note 46; see also supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
142. For examples of changes, see In re International House of Pancakes Antitrust Litig., 536
F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1976); Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,001 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981); HEW Corp. v. Tandy Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 62,424 (D. Mass. 1979); and
In re Clark Oil & Refining Corp. Antitrust Litig., 422 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, revd in part, and re-
manded, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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franchisor retaliatory measures (particularly against franchisee class
representatives),.4  and frequently engender procedural combat in
which the parties bleed themselves dry by exhausting every procedure
and appeal during several years of litigation.14 While class actions can
lead to a court-sanctioned, negotiated settlement between franchisor
and franchisees,'145 the ultimate effects of filing a class action are unpre-
143. M. Klein, Alternative Routes Available for the Resolution of Disputes Between Fran-
chisee and Franchisor, Remarks at the University of Missouri at Kansas City's Second Annual
Franchise Law Seminar 4-10 to 4-11 (1980). Klein stated that one "can expect the franchisor to
come out swinging in every direction, sometimes below the belt," and to use "every ounce of its
vast economic superiority, both in court and otherwise, to rid itself not only of the [class action]
lawsuit, but very likely of the franchisee [who filed it] as well." Id. at 4-10. According to Klein,
franchisees in one class action were told by the franchisor's president that once the class action
was over, the franchisor was going to take "very firm action to rid itself of the class representa-
tives." Id. at 4-10 to 4-11. In another instance, a franchisee class representative was advised that
his franchisor, who leased the franchisee's business premises from a third party, was giving up the
lease at the expiration of its term, and building another store nearby, which it would franchise to a
third party. Id. at 4-11; see also In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litig., 1972
Trade Cas. (CCH) T 73,797 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (discussing a class action brought by franchisees,
during which the franchisor was enjoined from terminating, threatening to terminate, or interfer-
ing with the business relationships of any of its franchisees except for delinquency on payments in
excess of 45 days).
Additionally, franchisors may attempt to induce other franchisees to avoid the litigation. See,
e.g., In re International House of Pancakes Antitrust Litig., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,864 (W.D.
Mo. 1972) (refusing to let franchisor communicate with franchisee class members in order to buy
them out); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,288 (D.D.C. 1972)
(ordering Chrysler to cease "soliciting, coercing, intimidating, or otherwise interfering with the
decision of class members [dealers] in regard to their response to the Class Notice"). Further pre-
trial decisions in the Merit Motors case may be found at Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1973
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 74,346 (D.D.C. 1973); and Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1972 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 74,116 (D.D.C. 1972). Chrysler ultimately won the case. 417 F. Supp. 263 (D.D.C.
1976), afl'd, 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
144. See Brown, supra note 50, at 5, col. 1; accord M. Klein, supra note 143, at 4-10 to 4-11.
As just one example of what franchisors will do to win a class action, Klein refers to a senior
partner in one of the large firms that defended the franchisor in In re International House of
Pancakes Franchise Litig., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,797. This attorney apparently "flew some
800 miles to another city to personally visit the restaurant of one of the class representatives and
obtain evidence of its alleged filthy condition." M. Klein, supra note 143, at 4-10. The franchisor
also hired private detectives. Id.
145. H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 10.08[5][b] (stating that franchisee class actions presently are
the only alternative to collective bargaining because "[t]here the parties can achieve some equality
of bargaining power; and counsel may legally negotiate the settlement of all issues involved in such
adversary proceedings [with the] settlement. . . subject to court approval" (emphasis added)). As
described by Mark J. Klein:
One factor encouraging franchisees to request class certification is that, once certified, settle-
ment negotiations are usually expedited. Preparing a class action for trial is a heavy burden
on all parties and their counsel. A large franchisor may decide to stay with an individual
action much longer, hopefully wearing out the franchisee and his counsel.
M. Klein, supra note 143, at 4-11. To be sure, franchisors may decide to fight a class action much
more vigorously than less threatening individual action. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying
text.
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dictable. Many classes never receive certification, 4" others are waylaid
by problems with the class representatives, 147 and still others proceed
only to lose at a later stage of the litigation.148 Even a franchisee win
may prove a Pyrrhic victory, leaving the franchisor financially too weak
to serve the franchisees' purposes.
Class actions are court actions based on claims of illegality and
seeking the intervention of a party (the court) often unfamiliar with the
intricacies of the franchised operation. As such, class actions are an in-
adequate substitute for direct collective bargaining between franchisor
and franchisees. Collective bargaining typically is much less expensive,
less time consuming, and less sidetracked by noncontractual issues that
may dominate a lawsuit.149 The most important distinctions between
the two are: (1) a class action requires a legal foundation, not simply a
desire for both parties to thrash out their differences; and (2) once a
negotiated agreement is approved by the franchisor and franchisees, a
class action requires that the parties obtain court approval.
Other procedures, such as offensive collateral estoppel, 150 test
cases,15 1 and consolidations of discovery and trial for common-issues
cases, 152 suffer from some of the same defects as does the class action.
Even if these procedures reduce costs and avoid some procedural issues
(such as class certification), the two central problems persist: Actions
using these procedures also require a legal basis for their initiation,'53
146. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976) (over-
turning district court's grant of class certification); Chase Parkway Garage, Inc. v. Subaru of N.E.,
Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,840 (D. Mass. 1982); Wardell v. Certified Oil Co., 1982-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 64,477 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Smith v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Aber-
crombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
147. See, e.g., Murphy v. Alpha Realty, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,566 (N.D. Ill.
1977); McCoy v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. IlM. 1975); AAMCO Automatic
Transmissions, Inc., v. Tayloe, 67 F.R.D. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
148. See, e.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,806
(C.D. Cal. 1979) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss at trial); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 417 F. Supp. 263 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting defendant summary judgment), aff'd, 569 F.2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
149. Examples of possible noncontractual issues include procedures and questions of past
fault.
150. See generally H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 11.13; see also Woo v. Great S.W. Acceptance
Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that a franchisee may rely upon collateral
estoppel for proof of unfair and deceptive acts found in prior FTC proceeding).
151. H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 11.13, at 11-39 n.3. Brown refers to Kypta v. McDonald's
Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 62,106 (S.D. Fla. 1978), in which the parties assented to the
"test case" approach taken in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974).
152. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (allowing transfer and consolidation of civil actions
involving common questions of fact, including pretrial proceedings).
153. A claim of antitrust violation, for example, would be a valid legal basis.
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and the ultimate decision maker is a judge, not the franchisor and its
franchisees. Thus, as with class actions, there are too many uncertain-
ties, procedural difficulties, and potentially high costs to make the test
case, collateral estoppel, or consolidation an effective substitute for col-
lective bargaining.
Another option is to seek administrative recourse by filing a com-
plaint with the FTC or with state authorities. If an agency pursues the
case, it is empowered to issue a consent decree, cease and desist order,
or other sanction having consequences for the franchised system as a
whole. In effect, the administrative route can produce worthwhile re-
sults without the tremendous expenditure of private resources.154 There
is no guarantee, however, that the government will take any action;
likewise, if the government does act, there is no control over its recom-
mendations. In short, franchisees that believe a disputed matter is cru-
cial probably would prefer bringing a private action, either individual or
class, over which they would have more control.
Finally, arbitration is an alternative to litigation. 5" While usually
154. See, e.g., FTC v. Lady Foot Int'l, Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 8979 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (imposing civil penalty against two executives of defunct franchisor for misrepresentations to
prospective franchisees); United States v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 53 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) Report No. 1328, at 251 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (issuing consent decree in FTC action to
pay up to $3.5 million to franchisees for FTC disclosure misrepresentations); FTC v. Kitco of
Nevada, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 66,658 (D. Minn. 1985) (ordering restitution for misrep-
resentation of the business and of its earnings potential); Towle Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,694 (FTC 1980) (issuing a cease and desist order to prohibit resale price maintenance schemes
imposed on retailers); Hartz Mountain Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,606 (FTC 1979) (bar-
ring a manufacturer from fixing retail prices, restricting territories, falsely disparaging competitors,
setting up exclusive dealing arrangements, discriminating on prices, and compelling certain "pro-
motional" activities); Howard Johnson Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,577 (FTC 1979) (requiring
Howard Johnson to permit its 253 franchisees to buy all but 23 of 170 products from manufactur-
ers other than Howard Johnson); Oregon v. Pioneer Northwest, Inc., 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) Report No. 1106, at 602 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1983) (preventing wholesale distributors from
setting dealers' prices by monitoring sales and giving special discounts to cooperative dealers);
California v. Morris-Tait Assocs., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 1 64,160 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981) (barring state
antitrust pricing violations imposed on dealers by manufacturer); Investment Servs. Int'l, Anti-
trust & Trede Reg. Rep. (BNA) Report No. 969, at E-5 (June 19, 1980) (action by Connecticut
attorney general resulting in a consent decree, with company agreeing to pay damages to people
who bought into the company's allegedly deceptive marketing of business opportunities).
155. Most arbitration cases are brought under an arbitration clause found in the franchise
agreement; otherwise, a case goes to court unless both parties choose arbitration. There are, how-
ever, a few limited areas of nonconsensual arbitration such as "court-annexed" arbitration now
found in some federal district courts and state courts. See, e.g., NJ). CAL. R. 500; M.D. FL. R. 8.01-
8.06; W.D. MICH. R. 43; WID. Mo. R. 30; D.N.J. R. 47; E.D.N.Y. ARs. R. §§ 1-7; M.D.N.C. R. 601-11;
S.D. OHIO R. 4.4.1; SID. OHIO ARB. R. 1.0-11.3; WID. OKLA. R. 43; E.D. PA. R. 8; WI). Tzx R. CIV. P.
300-9; see also Allison, The Context, Properties, and Constitutionality of Nonconsensual Arbitra-
tion: A Study of Four Systems, 1990 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 16-18 & nn.72-74; Keilitz, Gallas &
Hanson, State Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Where Is It Today?, 12 STATE CT. J.,
Spring 1988, at 4, 6-8. Arbitration is no more significant for franchise matters, however, than for
other court cases.
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considered an efficient, less expensive method for dispute resolution
that is geared especially toward parties who have a continuing business
relationship,156 arbitration generally cannot substitute for collective
bargaining.157 Like court actions, it requires a claim-a contention that
there has been some wrong that should be redressed. A desire simply to
negotiate differences is insufficient. 158 Most importantly, without an ef-
fective arbitration clause binding the franchisor to negotiate with fran-
chisees collectively, franchisors simply cannot be forced to deal with the
franchisees as a group. Arbitration is thus subject to the will of the
franchisor; absent the franchisor's consent, it is unlikely to include any
collective bargaining.
V. LABOR LAW
A. Franchisee Advisory Councils and Franchisee Associations
Franchisors have advanced essentially five reasons for forming and
assisting franchisee advisory councils: (1) promoting and improving
communications between franchisees and franchisor; (2) promoting and
increasing understanding of the particular franchised system; (3)
strengthening and professionalizing the working relationship between
franchisees and the franchisor's management; (4) developing a forum
for discussing ways to enhance franchisee and franchisor profits; and (5)
exploring "growth opportunities" for both franchisees and the
156. See Arbitration Clauses-Valuable Methods for Solving Business Problems Arising in
Long-Term Business Arrangements, 28 Bus. LAw. 585 (1973) (discussing arbitration in several dis-
tinctive continuing business relationships); see also, e.g., B. WEBsTER, supra note 8, at 188 (stating
that in most cases, arbitration is quicker and less expensive than litigation); Allison, Arbitration
Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public
Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219, 221-22 & n.15 (1986) (concluding that arbitration is private, faster,
cheaper, more likely to have an expert decision maker, and more likely to preserve commercial ties
between disputants); Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 433-40, 472-
77 (1988) (agreeing with Allison and listing arbitration advantages such as flexibility, informality,
and efficiency).
157. Indeed, some see binding arbitration as a means to control franchisees and limit or fore-
stall class actions. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 121, at 545. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-15 (1988), can further these uses of arbitration because § 2 of the Act-requiring enforcement
of an arbitration provision in a contract involving interstate commerce-preempts conflicting state
franchise laws. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Good (E) Business Sys. v. Ray-
theon Co., 614 F. Supp. 428 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
158. Arbitration is adversarial rather than conciliatory in nature. See Faure, The Arbitration
Alternative: Its Time Has Come, 46 MoNT. L. REv. 199, 200 (1985) (noting that arbitration is
neither mediation nor facilitation); Stipanowich, supra note 156, at 425 n.1; Stulberg, Negotiation
Concepts and Advocacy Skills: The ADR Challenge, 48 ALB. L. REV. 719, 720 (1984) (stating that
arbitration "incorporate[s] substantially the same operating assumptions of the adversarial pro-
cess"). An operative collective bargaining arrangement may provide a process by which future dif-
ferences could be mediated or arbitrated, even though no legal wrong has been committed.
1536
FRANCHISEE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
franchisor. 5 9 The advisory council often deals with product develop-
ment, operations, training, system standards, firm policy and planning,
customer demands, advertising and other marketing strategies, inven-
tory, equipment, and services. It may function as advisor to both fran-
chisees and franchisor, negotiator-in a very limited sense-with the
franchisor on behalf of the franchisees, and purchaser of products and
services. 60 The advisory council, however, definitely is not a collective
bargaining agent.'6 l
As franchising systems mature-both in industry and in particular
franchised operations-more and more franchisors encounter franchisee
associations. Although franchisors initiate or otherwise encourage fran-
chisee advisory councils in order to meet the needs of the franchisor as
well as the franchisees, associations are completely independent of the
franchisor. For example, the association of Midas muffler shop franchis-
ees lists as its purposes: Promoting the interests of its members, ad-
vancing members' trade, promoting cooperation among members,
encouraging the exchange of ideas among members, and securing and
disseminating to members essential or helpful information.'6 2 The em-
phasis is entirely on the franchisees' interests; nothing is included about
the franchise system as a whole. Furthermore, the Midas franchisee as-
sociation asserts that its primary raison d'etre is "the redress of the
traditional economic imbalance between franchisor and franchisee.' i6 3
The distinction between advisory councils and associations is sig-
nificant: franchisors historically have been more receptive to the advi-
sory council-a system whereby franchisees can voice their concerns
without really forming a collective threat to franchisor power and deci-
159. Davis, The Prospective [sic] of In-House Counsel: Organization, Compliance/Enforce-
ment Programs, Negotiated Sales, Transfer, Termination, and Advertising and Franchisee Coun-
cils, in P.L.I. COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE No. 486, FRANCHISING 1989: BUSINESS STRATEGIES &
COMPLIANCE ISSUES 561, 641 (1989) (providing in appendix 4 the purposes and goals of the 7-
Eleven National Advisory Council).
160. Rudnick, Structuring the Franchise Relationship, in P.L.I. COMMERCIAL LAW & PRAC-
TICE No. 412, FRANCHISING 1987, BusINss STRATEGIES & LEGAL COMPLIANCE 97, 153-54 (1987); IN-
TERNATIONAL FRANCHISE Ass'N, How TO ORGANIZE A FRANCHISEE ADVISORY COUNCIL (rev. ed. 1985)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASS'N].
161. This principle is implicit in IFA publications such as How to Organize a Franchise Ad-
visory Council. This document contains several sample bylaws for advisory councils, each empha-
sizing their advisory and communicative role, with the concept of franchisor-council negotiations
(let alone such talks leading to system-wide binding agreements) conspicuously absent from any
listed powers or purposes. INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASS'N, supra note 160.
162. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27a, Appendix-Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 (Bylaws of Na-
tional Muffler Dealers Association, Inc., dated April 1971), National Muffler Dealers As'n v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) (No. 77-1172).
163. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, National Muffler Dealers As'n v. United States, 440
U.S. 472 (1979) (No. 77-1172); see also supra notes 122-25, 159 and accompanying text.
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sion making.6 4 Although advisory councils serve many unquestionably
useful functions,' they can be likened also to "company unions," 166
which are proscribed by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA).16 7 As long as the franchisor-franchisee relationship is not sub-
ject to the NLRA, s'6 however, these advisory councils avoid the fate of
164. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 50, at 5, col. 3; see also supra notes 122-25, 160-61 and
accompanying text. John H. Rodgers, the general counsel for Southland Corporation, noted the
usefulness of the IFA guidelines for setting up advisory councils, and remarked that "advisory
councils serve a useful purpose in communicating franchisee interests to the franchisor," and
warned franchisors to "make the council's rules clear and make it a body that does no more than
provide input or recommendations to the franchisor." Rodgers, supra note 91, at 499 (emphasis
added).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 159-60.
166. For instance, in writing about automobile manufacturers and their dealers-franchisees,
commentators have found similarities between advisory councils and company unions. One author
stated: "Ford [Motor Company] backs the National Dealer Council as the grievance and bargain-
ing panel in much the same way industrial employers once supported company unions whose alle-
giances, at best, were split. Those who disagree with the policy are terminated." Note,
Contracts-Smith v. Ford Motor Company: Limitation on a Franchsor's Right to Interfere with
Contracts Between a Franchisee and an Employee, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1284, 1293 (1976) (footnotes
omitted). Harold Brown has noted, "Rather than tolerate collective bargaining as a means toward
equalizing power, franchisors have sought to employ every 'busting' strategy borrowed from the
field of labor relations, ranging from simple persuasion to company-sponsored councils, and
threatened termination for the leaders to favored treatment for the sheep." H. BROWN, supra note
1, at 4-34 (emphasis added). In addition, Brown states that the "independence of. . .associations
affords a marked contrast to the ineffectiveness of the regional 'Dealer Councils' created by the
individual manufacturers. . . .One possible reason for the general ineffectiveness of such councils
is their close identity with the individual manufacturer." Brown, supra note 127, at 815.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). As amended, the provision states: "(a) It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer. .. (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . ..." Id.
Company unions flourished during the 1920s and early- to mid-1930s. They were employee
organizations initiated or assisted by the employer. Although sometimes independent of the em-
ployer, the company unions often were established to create subservient entities that would turn
collective bargaining into a "colloquy between one side of [the employer's] mouth and the other."
R. BROOKS, UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING: AN AcCOUNT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD AND ITS WORK 68-69 (1939). But cf. A. SHOSTAK, AMERIcA's FORGOTrEN LABOR ORGANIZATION
3 (1962). Arthur Shostak notes severe abuses, but remarks that many single-firm, "company" un-
ions served legitimate purposes by "offer[ing] members local autonomy, low dues, industrial har-
mony, [and] competitive labor contracts." Id.
The leading case on company domination of or interference with a "labor organization" (a
broadly construed term) remains NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). In Cabot Car-
bon the Court noted that the NLRA definition of "labor organization," currently found at 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988), states that at least part of the organization's purpose is "dealing with em-
ployers," a term much broader than what is commonly referred to as "collective bargaining."
Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 213. Thus, an employer is barred even from interference with, domina-
tion of, or support for a "labor organization," which according to the Cabot Carbon definition may
include an employee committee intended not to negotiate with the employer, but merely to handle
employee grievances and make proposals.
168. See McGuire, The Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 215,
251 (1971) (concluding that "the franchisor in the larger enterprise need not be concerned with the
possibility that ... the [National Labor Relations] Board will classify him as the employer of
[the] franchisees"). As for smaller, single-distributor franchisees, the question of Board jurisdiction
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the company unions.
B. Franchisees as Independent Contractors or Employees
The NLRA generally does not secure any rights at all for franchis-
ees as independent contractors. The Act neither requires franchisor-
franchisee collective bargaining 69 nor outlaws unfair franchisor prac-
tices. 17 0  In the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), which
amended and added to the NLRA, Congress specifically exempted inde-
pendent contractors from NLRA coverage. The Act states, "When used
in this Act. . . the term 'employee'. .. shall not include. . . any indi-
vidual having the status of an independent contractor ... "I'll
Courts have applied this statute in several franchising cases as well
as analogous (e.g., dealership) cases. By adopting the common-law
master-servant test, the critical labor law focus is on whether the
franchisor controls the manner by which a result is to be accomplished
(thus establishing an employment relationship subject to the NLRA),
or reserves control only as to the overall result sought (thus establishing
an independent contractor arrangement beyond the NLRA's scope)." 2
revolves around whether the franchisee is an employee of the franchisor. In other words, does the
franchisor satisfy the common-law concept of being the master of the franchisee through a sub-
stantial right of control? See id. at 226-31, 250; see also NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S.
254, 256 (1968) (stating that both the NLRB and courts used common-law principles of agency to
resolve the independent contractor-employee question). More often than not, the distributor-
dealer-franchisee is found to be an independent contractor. See infra notes 178-86 and accompa-
nying text.
169. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act §§ 7, 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(5) (1988)) (covering collective bargaining rights of
employees and duties of employers, respectively), quoted infra at notes 190-91.
170. If the NLRA were applicable, unfair labor practices by a franchisor (an NLRA "em-
ployer") would include, inter alia, creating company-controlled (franchisor-controlled) councils
and terminating the franchises held by franchisee association leaders (if only because of their asso-
ciation activities, not for legitimate reasons). National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1),(2),(3), 49
Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),(2),(3) (1988)).
171. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988)). The definition also excludes supervisors and
managerial employees. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 679-82 (1980); NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-90 (1974). This area of the law is discussed infra Part V(C).
172. See Mister Softee of Indiana, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 354 (1966); see also United Ins. Co. of
Am., 390 U.S. at 256; McGuire, supra note 168, at 226-31, 250, 256.
The United States is not alone in this approach. In FRANCHISING COMmTrTEE SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW (ABA), SURVEY OF FOREIGN LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
FRANCHISING 29 (Belgium part), 43 (Canada part), 40 (Italy part), 30 (Sweden part) (P. Zeidman 2d
ed. 1990) [hereinafter FOREIGN SURVEY], it is expressly noted that the labor laws of Belgium, Can-
ada, Italy, and Sweden do not cover independent contractors such as franchisees. Other sections of
the text note that franchisors are not vicariously liable for their franchisees' torts unless the
franchisors retain control over the franchisees' conduct (i.e., are essentially employers). Id. at 46
(France part), 37 (Japan part), 27 (Switzerland part) (stating, "that a franchisor [in Switzerland]
will be held liable for negligence of a franchisee (respondeat superior principle) is highly unlikely,
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As the case law has developed, some courts-although consistently re-
taining the use of a right to control test-have suggested the need to
look at other factors to determine whether a hiree is an employee or an
independent contractor. Each court employing this approach generally
has examined numerous factors. These factors include the parties' in-
tent; the hiree's risk of loss, ownership of equipment, work skills, and
ability to hire others; the work conditions for the hiree compared to
acknowledged employees; the type of goods or services in question; the
mode of compensation; the methods for supervising the hiree; and the
hiree's form of business (e.g., sole proprietorship, partnership, or
corporation).17 1
Because they deal with the broad, fundamental concepts of agency
law, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determinations, and sub-
sequent court reviews, are highly dependent on the facts of each case.
Two unanimous NLRB decisions, decided roughly at the same time and
with essentially the same Board members, demonstrate how decisions
turn on the substance of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, not sim-
ply the language of the franchise agreement. In Fugazy Continental
Corp. 74 the NLRB held that franchised limousine drivers were employ-
ees. Specifically, the Board found that the "franchises" were short-term
(two years); the franchisor had complete discretion over renewal; and
the franchisor chose the franchisee's vehicle, level of insurance, uni-
form, and fare structure. 7 5 In Kallmann'76 however, the Board reached
a different result with respect to restauranteurs. In Kallmann restau-
rant franchisees were held to be independent contractors. The Board
as a franchisee is deemed to be an independent contracting business"). Although Mexico and a few
other nations broadly construe the employment concept for purposes of applying their social wel-
fare legislation, id. at 28-29 (Mexico part), it seems implicit from the discussions of foreign
franchising that franchisees typically will be viewed not as potential unionizers, but as indepen-
dent contractors with employees of their own. See, e.g., id. at 46 (Australia part), 29 (Denmark
part), 19 (Israel part), 29 (South Korea part), 21 (Spain part), 26 (South Africa part), 19 (Taiwan
part), 30 (United Kingdom part). Exceptions always can be found: in 1969, "the Labor Court of
Sweden held that the gasoline station dealers of Esso were entitled to collective bargaining rights
in view of the dominant economic power of the oil company and the control inherent in the fact
that the dealers had to look to the company as their sole source of supply." Brown, supra note 127,
at 813; see also infra note 205.
173. See, e.g., NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., 651 F.2d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 1981); Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 271, 279-82 (9th Cir. 1977); Lorenz Schneider Co.
v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975); News-Journal Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 65, 67-68 (3d
Cir. 1971).
174. 231 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1977), enforced, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979), supp. enforcement
proceedings, 276 N.L.R.B. 152 (1985), and 106 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 12,389 (2d Cir. 1987).
175. Fugazy, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1344-45.
176. 245 N.L.R.B. 78 (1979), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds sub nom.
Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981).
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found that the franchisees selected suppliers, established prices, and
made large initial investments; the franchisees made hiring decisions
and controlled labor relations; the franchises were long-term affiliates
(over fifteen years); and the franchisees were responsible for paying as-
sessments, taxes, and insurance. 177
Many NLRB franchising cases have concerned "owner-drivers" or
"salesman-drivers" such as truck drivers, taxi drivers, and traveling
salesmen. In some of the cases, these groups have been found to be em-
ployees. 17  Most ruling bodies, however, have held that these fran-
chisee-lessees or owner-operators are actually independent
contractors.' 9 Another frequent type of case has concerned newspaper
dealer-franchisees. In these cases the Board has found the affiliates to
be employees in some instances and independent contractors in
others. 80
177. Kallmann, 245 N.L.R.B. at 78-79.
178. See, e.g., NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding driver-
salesmen to be employees), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982); Amber Delivery Serv., 651 F.2d at 57
(holding that package-delivery drivers were employees, despite employer's attempts to convert
them into independent contractors in an attempt to avoid unionization); City Cab Co. v. NLRB,
628 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that "contract" drivers were employees, not franchisees);
Fugazy, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1344 (finding "franchisee" limousine drivers to be employees); Seven-Up
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596 (1st Cir. 1974) (declining to call truck driving distributors
franchisees); Mister Softee, 162 N.L.R.B. 354 (1966) (declaring "franchisee" salesmen to be
employees).
179. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (lessee taxi drivers);
NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1983) ("daily lessee" cabdrivers);
Air Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1982) (taxi drivers operating under concession
agreement with airport); NLRB v. Tri-State Transp. Corp., 649 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1981) (lessor-
operator of tractor-trailer); NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1979) (owner-opera-
tor truck drivers); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (lessee cab drivers); Merchants Home Delivery Serv. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978)
(owner-operators of delivery trucks); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d
271 (9th Cir. 1977) (owner-operators of dump trucks and other construction vehicles); Lorenz
Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1975) (route salesman-distributors of snack foods);
SIDA of Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975) (drivers in a taxi drivers' association);
Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970) (company-financed owner-drivers of dairy
delivery trucks); Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 697, 702 (10th Cir. 1970) (unionized milk
truck drivers who had become owner-operator-distributors); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 180
(7th Cir. 1967) (snack food distributors who were owner-operators of the delivery trucks); NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 313 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962) (unionized driver-salesmen who had become franchis-
ees); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.) (unionized milk truck
drivers who had become owner-operators), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960); National Van Lines v.
NLRB, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960) ("contract" drivers who furnished their tractor-trailers); Preci-
sion Bulk Transp., Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 437 (1986) (owner-operator truck drivers); Don Bass Truck-
ing, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 172 (1985) (owner-operator truck drivers); Tarheel Coals, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B.
563 (1980) (owner-operator truck drivers); Gold Medal, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 895 (1972) (driver-sales-
men who owned and maintained their own trucks); Bambury Fashions, Inc., 1969 N.L.R.B. Dec.
(CCH) 21,326 (independent traveling salesmen of apparel); Pure Seal Dairy Co., 1962 N.L.R.B.
Dec. (CCH) T 10,826 (distributors who furnished their own trucks).
180. See, e.g., St. Charles Journal, Inc. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that
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For a long while, the NLRB apparently tried to expand NLRA cov-
erage beyond mere common-law employees."i 1 On the whole, however,
its efforts have been checked. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB,'8 2 noted that in slightly more than ten years
the NLRB was overruled a dozen times after finding lessees, dealers, or
owner-operators to be employees rather than independent
contractors.8 3
In short, while the facts of each case control, and sham franchises
will not remove an employer from the grasp of federal labor law, 84
NLRA coverage never extends to a typical franchise. Indeed, except for
a few special areas such as taxis, trucking, single-product distributors,
and newspaper dealers,8 5 reported cases are rare. Franchisees seeking
relief from an oppressive franchise or a franchisor's abusive treatment
typically do not look to federal labor relations law for help.'
newspaper carriers were so controlled by company as to be employees); Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d
699 (9th Cir.) (holding news dealer to be independent contractor), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008
(1972); News-Journal Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1971) (determining that truck driver
deliverymen were employees), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Herald Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d
430 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that newspaper distributors were employees); Fort Wayne Newspapers,
Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 854 (1982) (finding newspaper distributors to be independent contractors); Oak-
land Press Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1980) (holding that owner-drivers who delivered newspapers
were employees); Donrey, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 744 (1976) (newspaper dealers who owned their deliv-
ery trucks were independent contractors); Las Vegas Sun, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 889 (1975) (newspa-
per home delivery dealers were independent contractors); Denver Post, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1162
(1972) ("independent merchant" distributors held to be independent contractors); News Syndicate
Co., 1967 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 21,327 (franchisees held to be employees); Long Island Daily
Press Publishing Co. v. Tomitz, 12 Misc. 2d 480, 176 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (franchisees
held to be independent contractors); see also Retail Clerks Int'l Union v. Quick Shop Markets,
Inc., 604 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding owners of franchised stores not to be employees, al-
though union prevailed on other grounds); Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d at 702 n.2, 703 n.3, 705, 706
(citing numerous cases); Site Oil Co. of Mo. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1963) (stating that gas
station franchisees were not employees); S.G. Tilden, Inc., 1968-2 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) $ 20,024
(franchisees of automotive repair shops are independent contractors); Southland Corp., 1968-1
N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 22,351 (franchisees of convenience stores are not employees).
181. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi, 721 F.2d at 383-84 n.39; Lorenz Schneider Co., 517 F.2d at 453
n.15; see also Adelstein & Edwards, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst: Independent Contrac-
tors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 191 (1969).
182. 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
183. Id. at 382 n.37.
184. See, e.g., Fugazy, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1344 (stating that failure to pay striking limousine
drivers money to which they were entitled in retaliation for drivers exercising their rights under §
7 of the National Labor Relations Act constituted an unfair labor practice); Borden, Inc., 181
N.L.R.B. 109 (1970) (finding that employer who compelled employees to become "franchisees" or
else risk having their sales routes sold to others violated the employer's NLRA duty to bargain
collectively with the employees' representatives because it bypassed the employees' certified collec-
tive bargaining agent), reaffirmed, 192 N.L.R.B. 31 (1971).
185. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
186. For more overview, see Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors,
and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DmT. L. Rxv. 555 (1989); McGuire, supra note 168; and Coin-
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C. Labor Law Rights for Nonemployees and Supervisors
1. Independent Contractors: Scott and the NLRA
While the key statutes have not been altered significantly since the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Board and court opinions
continue to broaden, narrow, and otherwise alter incrementally prior
statutory interpretations. Occasionally, however, a holding or dictum
seems to emphasize a new approach and not simply a variation. In the
1985 case of Scott v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70187 a fed-
eral trial court hinted at shifting the emphasis away from previous au-
thorities' exclusive focus on whether a claimant is an employee or
represents employees. In eliminating certain injunctions on picketing by
a union representing exclusively independent contractors, the court
stated, "[the fact that the NLRA is primarily concerned with em-
ployer-employee relationships and that § 2(3) [29 U.S.C. § 152(3)] pro-
vides a definition of 'employee' does not mean this definition should be
read into every section of the Act, regardless of whether a given section
makes reference to conduct by 'employees.'-188 Conceivably, if this
broader view of the NLRA were extended beyond the picketing issues
in Scott, franchisees could seek some relief under portions of the
NLRA. 89
The statute itself, however, suggests the contrary. NLRA Sections
7 (declaring fundamental labor rights) and 8(a) (listing employer unfair
labor practices) seem to require employee status. Section 7190 declares
ment, Employees and Independent Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 278 (1977). Marc Linder notes that Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
several Canadian provinces have accorded collective bargaining rights to persons who, under pres-
ent interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, would be considered unprotected nonem-
ployees. Linder, supra, at 599. He proposes that American law extend organizational rights to
these "employee-like" persons. Id. at 557, 601. Linder's analysis, however, is based on class, and
thus only reaches those who are not "capital accumulaters" but are in need of a facilitated "transi-
tion to employee status." Id. at 601. Franchisees, as capitalists, still would not be protected under
this expanded NLRA coverage.
187. 633 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
188. Id. at 128; see also Chipman Freight Servs. v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1988)
(corresponding to Scott, and finding that union of independent contractors had right to strike and
picket peacefully).
189. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1988) (expressly allowing primary picketing).
190. Section 7 of the NLRA (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)), states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)].
The italicized portion was added via the Labor Management Relations Act, tit. I, sec. 7, 61 Stat.
140 (1947).
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rights for "employees," and Section 8(a) 191 concerns interference with
"employees" and administration of or membership in "labor organiza-
tions." The definitions of "employee" outlined in 29 U.S.C. Section
152(3)192 and "labor organization" stated at 29 U.S.C. Section 152(5)
apply whenever used in the NLRA. 93 Because the term "labor organi-
zation" refers to "any organization of any kind, or any agency or em-
ployee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate,"'194 Sections 8(a)(2) and (3) on "labor organizations" are in-
applicable to groups that are not composed of some employees. Thus,
the court in Scott seemed to view "labor organizations" as distinct from
"employees" in a way that the statutory definitions do not.19 5
2. Supervisory Employees
Some circuit courts actually have treated unions composed solely of
supervisors in a way that seems to overlook the 29 U.S.C. Section
152(5) requirement that a labor organization include "employees,"
which under Section 152(3) specifically excludes, inter alia, indepen-
dent contractors and supervisors. In effect, these courts have held that
under 29 U.S.C. Section 185196 supervisor unions can sue or be sued in
191. The National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988), states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7 of this title [29 U.S.C. § 157];
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organiza-
tion or contribute financial or other support to it...;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. ..;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 9(a) of this title [29 U.S.C. § 159(a)].
192. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152-168 (1988). The Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
not only amended these provisions of the NLRA (via Title I), but also added new sections (Titles
II, Im, IV, and V). 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
194. National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988) (emphasis added).
195. The court noted that the applicable Labor Management Relations Act amendment to
NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B) refers to a "labor organization," but does not mention specifically "employees."
Therefore, the court assumed that a labor organization may consist exclusively of nonemployees
(independent contractors). Scott 633 F. Supp. at 128. For purposes of the NLRA, however, a labor
organization must include employees. See supra notes 171, 192-94 and accompanying text.
196. Enacted via § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 185 (1988)
states, in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
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federal court with respect to violations of collective bargaining agree-
ments. 197 Indeed, in Majewski v. B'nai B'rith Int'l9 s the D.C. Circuit
Court held that when a supervisory employee sues an employer for al-
legedly violating the collective bargaining agreement between the em-
ployer and the supervisors' association, federal labor law requires that
the suit be filed under 29 U.S.C. Section 185, not as a diversity
action.199
Scott fails to mention any of these cases, perhaps for the simple
reason that independent contractors are nonemployees beyond even a
fair or useful analogy to the supervisors, who actually are employees, in
these 29 U.S.C. Section 185 cases. Independent contractors, thus, do
not have the attributes that moved Congress and the courts to accord
supervisory employees the limited right to organize collectively and to
sue or be sued on their collective bargaining agreements."'
3. Franchisees
In finding authority for court enforcement powers under 29 U.S.C.
Section 185, federal courts have emphasized the special nature of super-
visory employees and their unions. After the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, supervisory employees no longer were guaranteed a right of
collective bargaining, but otherwise still enjoyed many traditional labor
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter. . . shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organiza-
tion may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of the United States.
197. See, e.g., District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Amoco Oil Co., 554 F.2d 774 (6th
Cir. 1977); Dente v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974); National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Globe Seaways,
Inc., 451 F.2d 1159, 1160 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971); see also infra note 207. But cf. International Org. of
Masters, Mates & Pilots v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 771, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1965); A.H. Bull Steamship Co. v.
National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 250 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957) (reasoning later overruled by
National Marine, 451 F.2d at 1159), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). These courts have not held,
however, that supervisor unions can sue under § 7 employee rights or § 8(a) unfair labor practices
by employers.
198. 721 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
199. Diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), is generally inappropriate because the
matter cannot arise under state law, which is preempted by federal law; however, 29 U.S.C. § 185
does not exclude the state courts. They, too, may hear pleas for enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements. State courts simply must apply federal law in deciding cases. Teamsters Local 174
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
200. Under § 2(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988), spe-
cific rights granted by the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152-168 (1988), are unavailable to supervisors as
well as independent contractors. For examples of such rights, see NLRA §§ 7 and 8(a), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157 & 158(a) (1988), and supra notes 190-91. See also Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 188 (1965) (holding that the enactment of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act meant that "§ 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory employees the rights to
engage in self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities under the umbrella
of § 8").
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rights. Independent contractors, including most franchisees, have no
such labor law heritage. The comments in Scott, therefore, may be read
as stretching the literal and historical bounds of the NLRA well beyond
what was done in court decisions dealing with supervisors. 20 1 Even if
construed most liberally in favor of franchisee groups, however, Scott
and the supervisory employee cases202 would not force franchisors to
recognize a franchisee association, to refrain from tactics that discour-
age franchisee membership in associations, or to negotiate with the as-
sociation. If the law did recognize franchisees as supervisory
employees, 0 3 or if franchisees otherwise retained labor law rights, the
franchise relationship could be affected when franchisors voluntarily
bargain with franchisee groups. In these instances, franchisees might be
permitted to proceed under 29 U.S.C. Section 185 in federal district
court for breaches of the contract between "employer" (franchisor) and
"labor organization" (franchisee association). No ruling of this kind has
201. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. With respect to matters covered by the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)), see Corporate
Printing Co. v. New York Typographical Union No. 6, 555 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that
suits dealing with independent contractors may come within the definition of "labor dispute" (cit-
ing American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968))). Corporate Printing Co. is dis-
cussed infra at notes 208 & 210.
202. See supra notes 187-89, 196-98 and accompanying text; infra note 207 and accompany-
ing text.
203. As stated by Professor Raymond McGuire, "the contractual lines of control held by the
franchisor are often so taut that it is difficult to distinguish the franchisee from an employee-
supervisor." McGuire, supra note 168, at 226. The franchise agreement is generally a set form
prepared by the franchisor, with little room for negotiation. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text. In such a case, the franchisee's independence really may be no more than that of a hired
manager. See, e.g., Hearings on Franchising Practices Reform Act: Hearings Before U.S. House of
Representatives Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 194 (1976) (statement of Rep. James H. Scheuer); Hear-
ings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business, Before U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Urban
and Rural Economic Development of the Select Comm. on Small Business, Part 1, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 309, 319 (1970) (statement of FTC General Counsel Buffington); E. DiXoN, JR., supra note 9,
at H-43 (explaining that though the franchisee is manager-owner of the franchise, the emphasis is
always on "manager" because the franchisee "must take orders from headquarters"); S. Lux-
EN EG, supra note 4, at 285 (stating that "[f]ranchisees function as managers"); B. SMrrH & T.
WEST, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that a franchisor says, "It's your business, but I control what you
do"); Brown, supra note 121, at 544 (paraphrasing the statement of a leading franchisor who lik-
ened the franchisee to a store manager, but noted that the franchisee, because of a substantial
capital outlay, is not able to quit and "come out whole"); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy:
The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considerations,
24 Bus. LAw. 1311, 1320 (1969) (explaining that there is a "ministerial instead of discretionary
participation quality in the franchisee's 'managing and operating his own business' "); O'Donnell,
No Entrepreneurs Need Apply, FoRBEs, Dec. 3, 1984, at 124 (contending that "[r]unning a
franchised business means giving up your independence and playing by someone else's rules," and
that franchising is for people (franchisees) who want to manage what someone else (the franchisor)
has created and for those who "don't have a product or the skills to establish [their] own
company").
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been reported, and-despite Scott and the supervisor cases-a ruling in
the future seems unlikely.
D. Summary
The problem for franchisees seeking to invoke the NLRA is that
they generally do not meet the NLRA definition of employees.2 04 Thus,
United States labor law is in most, if not all, respects of no benefit to
franchisees seeking to advance their collective rights.20 5
204. See supra notes 169-71, 179, 184-86 and accompanying text. Even the supervisory em-
ployee cases-which somewhat favor unionization and collective negotiations-concern the rights
of employees, not independent contractors. See supra text following note 200.
Assuming arguendo that a "franchisee-as-employee" status could be attained and would be
desirable for purposes of collective bargaining and other labor law safeguards, franchisees would
seek to avoid that status in other areas of the law. For instance, as an "employee" the franchisee
would have little standing to pursue antitrust claims against its "employer," the franchisor. See
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007
(1983); In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1016 (1983). Under standards announced in Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), the franchisee-employee may have to show par-
ticipation as a competitor or consumer in the same market as the alleged malefactors, that the
sustained injury was the kind that the antitrust laws were intended to forestall, that the alleged
antitrust violations caused the injury, that the measure of harm would not be speculative, and that
the handling of the case would be "within judicially manageable limits" (i.e., avoiding the
problems inherent to complex damages apportionment or duplicative recoveries). Id. at 534-45.
In Associated Gen. Contractors the Supreme Court denied standing to a labor union that
claimed the defendant association conspired to restrain the union's business activities by coercing
contractors, landowners, and others to deal with nonunion contractors. The Court found no nexus
between the quality of competition and the union's interests, and no indication that, as competi-
tion increased, the union's interests also would rise. Id. at 539. If the franchisee really has the
characteristics or status of an employee, restraints on competition must affect him within his own
market as a franchisee-employee. Absent restraints on this particular labor market, the clear trend
is for courts to admonish the plaintiff employee to sue for wrongful discharge, or breach of con-
tract, but not for antitrust violations. See Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, 828 F.2d 24 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wokefern
Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d at 514. But
cf. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff had standing
because he was the victim of a boycott in the labor market), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985);
Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1423 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that plain-
tiffs who were coerced into participating in an illegal scheme had standing).
205. See, e.g., Hanna Mining, 382 U.S. at 181; Amoco Oil, 554 F.2d at 774; Dente, 492 F.2d
at 10; see also supra note 200.
Other nations have considered proposals to give franchisees collective bargaining rights
against their franchisor. See, e.g., Gast, Franchising in Europe-France, in INTERNATIONAL
FRANCHISING-AN OvERVIEw 379, 380-81 (M. Mendelsohn ed. 1984). Gast notes that the French
government has been considering the enactment of a law specifically about franchising, with one of
the two main proposals being "that the franchisees merge into associations, with which the
franchisor would be obliged to negotiate agreements and disputes." Id. As best can be determined,
no such collective bargaining franchisee "union" laws have been put into effect anywhere. In fact,
only in the past year did France adopt a law on franchising, one concerned only with disclosure,
and not with any substantive rights such as collective bargaining. Telephone interview with Philip
F. Zeidman, First Chairman of ABA Antitrust Law Section's Committee on Franchising, and
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Franchisee hopes must focus on broad statutory changes or on
franchisor recognition of nonemployee collective bargaining units com-
posed of franchisees. Statutory changes seem unlikely, and the recogni-
tion of nonemployee units is strictly voluntary.0 6 Indeed, while a
franchisor's recognition of these units perhaps could bind the parties
before a court under 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a),0 7 one court has stated
that a company cannot be estopped from challenging workers' employee
status even though it had recognized those workers previously as em-
ployees.2 °8 Under this interpretation, recognition must not only arise
freely, but always must remain voluntary.
Although franchisees presumably have the right to organize, 2 9 and
federal courts may be powerless to issue injunctions against franchisee
organizational efforts or strikes,2 10 the antitrust issues still remain a
Washington Counsel to the International Franchise Association (Sept. 7, 1990). The only nations
with perhaps even some prospect of granting collective bargaining rights to franchisees are in the
"Socialist World." Id.; see also FOREIGN SURVEY, supra note 172.
206. See Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372 v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 969, 971 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Amoco Oil, 554 F.2d at 778 n.3. Both cases dealt with
unions composed of supervisors. The Court in Hanna Mining discussed the Labor Management
Relations Act's amendment of 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), which excluded supervisory workers from the
definition of "employees." The Court stated Congress's "propelling intention was to relieve em-
ployers from any compulsion under the [NLRA] and under state law to countenance or bargain
with any union of supervisory employees." Hanna Mining, 382 U.S. at 189.
207. In such cases, the NLRB would have no jurisdiction. See Majewski, 721 F.2d at 826
(stating that "for more than a dozen years now, district and appellate courts have uniformly con-
cluded that § 301 [29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)] does apply to agreements involving labor organizations
that contain supervisors"); District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Grand Bassa Tankers, 663
F.2d 392, 398 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the definition of "employee" in 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) has
nothing to do with federal jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)); accord Amoco Oil, 554 F.2d at
774; Crilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1976); Dente, 492 F.2d at 10;
Isbrandsten Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); see
also supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
208. Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372, 735 F.2d at 971. However, while franchisors
are not subject to collective bargaining with their franchisees, they apparently cannot obtain the
type of relief frequently given to employers before 1932: federal court injunctions against strikes. If
franchisees call a nonviolent strike, they should be protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47
Stat. 70 (1932), which very broadly deprives federal district courts of the power to issue injunc-
tions as to labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 113 (1988). The Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically
states that the labor disputants need not "stand in the proximate relation of employer and em-
ployee" to be covered by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982). The dispute even can be drawn be-
tween "employers" and other "employers." 29 U.S.C. § 113(a)(2) (1988); see also Corporate
Printing Co., 555 F.2d at 20-21 (noting the broad meaning of "labor dispute" under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act); A.H. Bull, 250 F.2d at 338-39 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 113 and overturning an injunc-
tion, but noting that "Bull can refuse to bargain [with its supervisors or] discharge the supervisors,
and be guilty of no unfair labor practice or conduct proscribed by any other law, either national or
local, relating to collective bargaining").
209. See Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 661 (1974) (holding that the Labor
Management Relations Act "does not forbid anyone to organize" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947))).
210. Corporate Printing Co., 555 F.2d at 19-22 (determining that managerial or supervisory
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barrier. Absent an exemption similar to that available for unions, the
collective efforts of franchisees are subject to effective attack under an-
titrust law or other unfair competition principles.21'
VI. ANTITRUST LAW: THE BROODING OMNIPRESENCE
Absent a labor organization exemption2 12 for franchisees, antitrust
law excuses what might otherwise stand exposed as simply an attempt
by franchisors to eradicate franchisee organizations. Antitrust law (and,
more broadly, the law on unfair competition) actually may be the pri-
mary rationale for dissolving franchisee associations.
Antitrust law, however, is more than merely an excuse to "bust"
franchisee "unions." Without careful planning, franchisee group activi-
ties can constitute an illegal combination in restraint of trade, an at-
tempt to monopolize trade, or some other antitrust violation.213
Regardless of whether a court speaks of a per se violation or the "rule
of reason, '21 4 franchisees and similar parties such as dealers and dis-
tributors have been found liable under antitrust law for the following
employees have no collective bargaining rights and no protection against retaliatory discharge and
replacement by nonunion workers, but that their organizing efforts cannot be enjoined by the fed-
eral courts); A.H. Bull, 250 F.2d at 338-39.
211. See infra Part VI. As to the antitrust limits placed on a state franchise law's right of
association statute, see supra notes 60, 64 and accompanying text (Michigan statute), and supra
note 65 (Massachusetts automobile dealers statute). For the same limits on the proposed Uniform
Act's right of free association provision, see supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Brown,
supra note 127, at 813 & nn.283-84 (noting that the Teamsters' effort to organize California gaso-
line station dealers was attacked successfully as a common-law criminal conspiracy, as were semi-
nal attempts to organize labor unions in the 1920s). A limited antitrust exemption is proposed
infra at text accompanying notes 262-69.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 262-69.
213. Note that a series of individual agreements, which in the aggregate restrain trade, do
not constitute thereby an antitrust violation. In Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d
139 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982), a bubble gum manufacturer sued its compet-
itor and the Major League Baseball Players' Association for allegedly violating the Sherman Act in
their arrangement for the sale of baseball cards. The key components of the arrangement were
Topps's individual licensing agreements with each player, the commercial authorization contract
between the association and each player, and the renegotiation of the players' licensing agreements
by Topps and the association. In rejecting the antitrust claims on the first prong of the arrange-
ment, the court stated, "Merely because Topps, through individual contracts with every minor
league player, managed to obtain license agreements with all major league players, does not make
the aggregation of these contracts an unlawful combination in restraint of trade." Id. at 149-50.
Under the reasoning in Fleer Corp. and other cases, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp.,
270 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 922 (1960), franchisees may become susceptible
to antitrust actions only when they act as a collective unit, not as independent entities.
214. Under the "rule of reason," conduct violates the antitrust laws only when, on balance, it
negatively affects competition. This "reasonableness" standard has continued to evolve since first
erected in the seminal case, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The per se
standard requires no analysis of competitive impact. Some activities so frequently foster anticom-
petitive results, they are deemed to be per se antitrust violations. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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activities: (1) persuading a franchisor to terminate the franchise of a
particular distributor; 15 (2) persuading a franchisor to refuse granting a
franchise to an applicant;216 (3) avoiding all dealings with a certain sup-
plier;217 (4) deciding how to allocate territories; 218 (5) acting in unison to
pressure a wholesaler into restoring exclusive sales territories; 219 (6)
boycotting a manufacturer for whom the association members ordina-
rily would produce goods;220 and (7) "blacklisting" manufacturers that
refused to accept the dealer association's standard contract. 221 Because
215. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (affirming jury verdict
in favor of plaintiff herbicide distributor who alleged that the manufacturer and other distributors
conspired to fix resale prices and terminated plaintiff for price cutting).
216. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). In
this case, a franchisee who was denied an additional franchise in a new location challenged an
arrangement whereby franchisor Holiday Inn let its existing franchisees "veto" franchise applica-
tions for their market areas. The court found this practice to be a horizontal restraint and, thus, a
per se antitrust violation, because Holiday Inn (which was also a franchisee) and other franchisees
were barred from operating any hotels other than Holiday Inns, and because the system allocated
the market of Holiday Inns among supposed competitors. Id. at 1242, 1246-52.
217. See Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). In Fashion Origina-
tors a group of textile and garment manufacturers, as well as their affiliates, adopted a scheme
whereby members of the group would not use or deal in textiles copied from a member's designs
and would sell only to retailers who promised not to use or deal in copied designs. The Supreme
Court unanimously held the scheme to violate the antitrust laws, regardless of whether tortious
copying thereby was curtailed. Id. at 468; see also Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979). In Larry V. Muko the court overturned a
directed verdict for the defendant restaurant chain and labor organizations because the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendants agreed future restaurants
would be built only by unionized contractors. If true, this action would constitute an antitrust
violation because there was no applicable labor law exemption. Id.
218. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), aff'd on reh'g, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
Topco, a buying association for small- to medium-sized regional supermarket chains, allocated ex-
clusive territories to its members, who had a type of veto over admission of new members. The
Court held that this practice was a horizontal restraint operating as a per se violation of Sherman
Act § 1, although price fixing was not part of the scheme. 405 U.S. at 606-12. But cf. Parsons v.
Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1982). Ford attempted to enforce a fleet allocation system
with its dealers that was designed to facilitate sales to legitimate end-users, and to bypass so-called
"bootleggers" like Parsons who made money by buying vehicles at fleet prices from one dealer, and
then reselling them at a higher price to others. Parsons alleged that the Ford system violated
antitrust law by "freezing out" bootleggers. The Court granted summary judgment for Ford, how-
ever, holding that it was not an antitrust violation or conspiracy to prevent a bootlegger from
obtaining vehicles under false pretenses of being an end-user and then reselling them for a profit
to another dealer. Id.
219. See United States Audio & Copy Corp. v. Philips Business Sys., 1983-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,364, at 70,169 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 237-38).
220. See Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 131 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1942) (affirming an
injunction against an independent fishermen's association that boycotted a packing company for
the company's failure to assent to a standard form of agreement, including a provision that the
company buy fish only from association members).
221. See National Ass'n of Women's & Children's Apparel Salesmen, 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) % 19,538 (FTC 1971) (enforcing FTC cease and desist order against association that black-
listed "uncooperative" manufacturers from trade shows and also excluded manufacturers who
failed to hire salesmen according to the standard contract drafted by the association), enforced sub
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franchisees are at the same level of the production and distribution
chain, their association, perhaps for more innocuous purposes than
those stated above, may nonetheless risk the finding of horizontal con-
spiracy-a per se antitrust violation.222 Indeed, although certain mem-
bership rules and self-regulating mechanisms, including trade group
codes, may be judged under the rule of reason standard,223 courts have
found per se violations with respect to other association activities such
as price regulation,2 4 boycotts and "blackballing" of nonmembers,225
and collective actions to force franchisor-like parties into changing their
policies toward group members. 26
Franchisee associations allegedly may foster trade constraints by
seeking to renegotiate franchise royalties, advertising fees, quality con-
trols, or other matters directly within the purview of the franchisor-
franchisee relationship. Because franchisees within a franchised system
are, at law, independent actors, their joint actions probably would be
treated as a horizontal restraint of trade just as if Exxon, Chevron, Mo-
bil, and Texaco jointly agreed upon prices or territories. The same ac-
tions taken by the franchisor would be subject only to a rule of reason
analysis.227
Responsibility for antitrust violations, however, can reach beyond
the franchisee association and its members. Even when franchisees are
nom. National Ass'n of Women's & Children's Apparel Salesmen, Inc. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 139 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973).
222. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 596; Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958).
223. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982)
(dealing with codes promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers); United States
Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that trotting-horse
association's prohibition against members racing at tracks that refused to join the association was
not a per se violation of antitrust laws, and that rule of reason sanctioned the prevention of "free
riding" by nonmembers).
224. This regulation has been found to be unlawful price fixing. See, e.g., United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966) (holding that auto dealers who, through their trade
association, induced suppliers to prevent other dealers from selling to or through discounters had
engaged in "a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade"); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Ohio ex rel.
Brown v. Central Ohio Chevrolet Dealers Ass'n, 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,437, at 66,924 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pleas 1975) (finding violation under Ohio antitrust law).
225. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600 (1914); Kruezer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir.
1984); National Ass'n of Women's & Children's Apparel Salesmen, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
19,538; Hinton, 131 F.2d at 88.
226. See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); Hinton, 131
F.2d at 88; National Ass'n of Women's & Children's Apparel Salesmen, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,538.
227. The actions would then be vertical restraints. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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the primary force behind certain anticompetitive actions, the potential
antitrust liability often extends to the franchisor as well, creating severe
consequences for the overall franchised system.2 Thus, in certain cir-
cumstances, even if the franchisor bears no animus toward the associa-
tion, the franchisor nonetheless may try to dissolve the association or
reduce it to just a communications clearinghouse between franchisees
and their franchisor, not a collective force for lobbying and negotiating.
In short, the franchisor often protects his interests-plays it safe-by
ignoring, restricting, undermining, or even destroying the franchisee
association.
Cunningham v. A.S. Abell Co.2 '9 aptly demonstrates a franchisor's
defensive tactics. In Cunningham the A.S. Abell Company, a newspaper
publisher, agreed to a form contract for each of its home delivery route
owners. The contract had been approved by the Sun Route Owners' As-
sociation and was presented to Abell by the Carriers' Council, the Asso-
ciation's elected representative. Abell essentially recognized the
Association as a collective bargaining unit, with the Carriers' Council
empowered to represent the carriers' best interests in negotiations with
the newspaper's management. 30
This arrangement lasted for several decades until Abell, prompted
by a Supreme Court antitrust ruling,23l reviewed its relations with the
carriers. Advised by counsel that the arrangement was unlawful, Abell
terminated the form contract and notified each carrier that new indi-
vidual agreements would be drafted.23 2 Abell subsequently terminated a
route owner, who in turn claimed Abell's action to be a breach of con-
tract. Both the trial court and the state supreme court upheld Abell's
right and duty under the antitrust laws to take these unilateral
actions. 33
Not surprisingly, there are limits to the antitrust liability of fran-
chisee associations. For example, as long as the franchisee association is
petitioning the government-lobbying to enact, broaden, or retain state
franchisee protection statutes, or bringing suit to obtain judicial or ad-
228. The franchisor may be held to be a coconspirator or other party to antitrust violations
by the franchisees. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). The cases are described
briefly supra at notes 215-16.
229. 264 Md. 649, 288 A.2d 157, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 865 (1972).
230. Id. at 651-52, 288 A.2d at 158.
231. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
232. The letter so informing each carrier also stated: "We [Abell] believe that we can legally
no longer deal concertedly with all Route Owners together, through the Carriers' Council as their
joint representative, or otherwise, but that we must deal with each Route Owner independently."
Cunningham, 264 Md. at 652-53, 288 A.2d at 159.
233. Id. at 653, 288 A.2d at 160.
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ministrative remedies against franchisor abuses-the association is im-
mune from antitrust liability.2 3 4 Additionally, as part of its legitimate
function, a trade group may gather and share overall industry price sta-
tistics or other general information without violating antitrust laws.23 5
When franchisees collectively and directly confront the franchisor, how-
ever, they run the strong risk of being considered part of a horizontal
conspiracy violative of Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2.236 For instance,
in United States Audio & Copy Corp. v. Philips Business Systems,
Inc.237 dealers in office dictation equipment joined forces to convince
their supplier to restore exclusive territories. They withheld payments,
filed lawsuits, interfered with the appointment of new dealers, en-
couraged dealers to switch to competing products, and pressured the
dealer trade association to encourage dealers to use andther supplier.
The trial court denied the defendant dealers' motion for summary judg-
ment. It found that these activities could establish a horizontal conspir-
acy to divide markets, an unlawful boycott, a concerted refusal to deal
with the supplier, an attempted monopolization, or perhaps even a con-
spiracy to fix prices. 38
Admittedly, courts sometimes have turned to the rule of reason in
cases dealing with trade associations, professional societies, or other
group arrangements analogous to collective franchisee activities.239 In
234. This is the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that activities of a labor union and two associa-
tions of restaurant and hotel employers in opposing the grant of building permits for McDonald's
restaurants consisted entirely of attempts to lobby and petition the government and, therefore,
were immune from antitrust liability), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); see also L.G. Balfour Co.
v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that because of the first amendment, the FTC "may
not prohibit the telling of a true statement even if that representation perpetuates the dominance
of a monopolist").
With regard to "sham" suits, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80
(1973), and California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
235. Wire Mesh Prods., Inc. v. Wire Belting Ass'n, 520 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
236. Section 1 violations include price fixing, boycotting, and refusing to deal. Section 2 fo-
cuses on monopolization or attempted monopolization. Many commentators have noted the ease
with which franchisee groups can violate antitrust laws, even for simply organizational and repre-
sentational activities. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 119, at 371; McGuire, supra note 168, at 251 &
n.137; Zwisler, Franchisee Associations: Legal Issues That Will Shape Their Future, Remarks at
the 18th Annual Legal Symposium of the International Franchise Association (IFA) 12-15 (May 6-
7, 1985) (transcript available from IFA, Washington, D.C.).
237. 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,364 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
238. Id. 70,169, 70,173; cf. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 752 (acknowledging that a franchisor
should listen to franchisee complaints as part of an ordinary course of business approach);
Betaseed, Inc. v. U. & I., Inc., 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the formation of a joint
committee by a competing grower and the regular grower's farmer-producers to petition the regu-
lar grower for changes is not a per se antitrust violation).
239. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (test-
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DeFilippo v. Ford Motor Co.24 eight Philadelphia-area Ford dealers
successfully combined to persuade Ford Motor Company not to give
other Ford dealers special terms for a new dealership. In ruling for the
dealer group, the Third Circuit looked at the rationale for the combina-
tion and concluded that the collective action was not a group boycott
constituting a per se unreasonable trade restraint.241 Inasmuch as the
plaintiffs still were able to become Ford dealers and otherwise conduct
business on the same terms as the other dealers, there was no Section 1
violation of the Sherman Act.24 2
Still, the antitrust cases generally cannot give comfort to franchisee
associations. While individual franchisees often turn to antitrust law2 3
for relief from what appears to be an oppressive franchisor,2" franchis-
ees that work together become susceptible to franchisor claims or coun-
terclaims of (1) antitrust violations, such as price fixing, group boycotts,
monopolization, illegal combinations, and other restraints of trade or
refusals to deal;2 45 (2) unfair competition and other torts;246 and (3)
ing price fixing by blanket license fee under rule of reason); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding that society's ban of competitive bidding was not a
per se violation, but was unlawful under the rule of reason). The choice between per se or rule of
reason revolves around the type of market behavior at issue. See, e.g., United States Audio, 1983-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,173 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (listing four per se Sherman Act violations). The per
se rule still applies to "horizontal" restraints-agreements among competitors at the same market
level (e.g., retail distributors). See Coin-Tel, Inc. v. Dukane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir.
1982).
240. 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1976).
241. Id. at 1320.
242. Id. at 1320-21.
243. Franchisees also commonly include counts alleging breaches of contract and misrepre-
sentation. For a discussion of problems franchisees might face in raising antitrust claims if the
franchisees are deemed to be employees of the franchisor, see supra note 204.
244. To forestall or prevent franchise, lease, or sales contract terminations, franchisees have
persuaded numerous courts that terminations would further a franchisor's anticompetitive prac-
tices. See, e.g., Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 1971) (and cases cited
therein). In Milsen a group of franchisees sued the franchisor and obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion against franchise terminations. Id. at 366-67. Furthermore, when franchisees sue their
franchisor and allege that a franchisor-initiated program violates the antitrust laws, the franchis-
ees' participation in that program cannot be used by the franchisor as an in par! delicto (of equal
fault) defense. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
245. See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982) (holding that an association may be liable for antitrust violations when its members with
real or apparent authority use the association to effectuate anticompetitive practices); Hinton v.
Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 131 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1942); United States Audio, 1983-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) T 65,364 (described supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text); National Ass'n of
Women's & Children's Apparel Salesmen, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 19,538 (FTC 1971) (de-
scribed supra note 221), enforced sub noam. National Ass'n of Women's & Children's Apparel
Salesmen v. FTC, 479 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); In re Detroit
Autodealers Ass'n, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 22,653 (FTC 1989) (stating that agreement among
area auto dealers to have all area showrooms closed on Saturdays and three weekday evenings was
unlawful restraint of trade; no labor law exemption applicable because agreement was among deal-
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even criminal conspiracy.247
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Present Situation: A Need for Well-Established and
Substantial Rights of Association
Occasionally franchisees are large and powerful,2 4s but usually they
are not. In most instances, their franchisors have a significant advan-
tage in resources-money, information, political influence, business ex-
perience, and access to professional advice.249
Franchisees generally do bear a greater degree of economic risk.
According to some commentators, the individual franchisee in most
franchised operations is much more likely to fail than the franchisor.
This risk differential results partly because the franchisor typically col-
lects substantial franchise fees up front and a percentage of gross sales
for the life of the agreement, regardless of whether the franchisee nets
any profit.25 0 Franchisors even have acknowledged the inequities of the
relationship.251 Indeed, some entire franchised systems are actually ex-
periments in which a franchisor establishes franchises as a means to
test the market for a product or service. If the product or service suc-
ceeds, the franchisor either will buy out the franchisees or compete with
ers, not really between dealers and their employees); H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 11.12, at 11-36 &
n.28; Brown, supra note 127, at 775 & n.54, 813-14 & nn.285-90; Chisum, supra note 119, at 371 &
n.414.
246. See, e.g., In re Pontiac Dealers Advertising Ass'n, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,011
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1979); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Central Ohio Chevrolet Dealers Ass'n, 1975-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 60,437 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1975); see also Brown, supra note 50, at 5, col. 2 n.9
(citing Burch v. Baltimore County Refuse Collectors Ass'n, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 258, Dec.
6, 1976, at 4).
247. Brown, supra note 127, at 813 & n.283.
248. See S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 272-73; Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising, 14 Sw.
U.L. REv. 155, 225 n.272 (1984).
249. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973) (stating that Shell
was the dominant party in the relationship and could dictate its terms), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920
(1974); Brief for Petitioner at 20, 27, 30, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S.
472 (1979) (No. 77-1172) (discussing the "inherently unequal economic power between the individ-
ual franchisee and the monolithic franchisor;" the "traditional economic imbalance" favoring
franchisors; and the strong "economic power of the large, monolithic franchisor"-something
checked only by franchisees joining together); H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 5.01, at 5-2 (stating
bluntly, "The franchisor has all of the legal and practical advantages"), § 9.01 (and that there is "a
marked, intentional, and constantly emphasized disparity in the parties' positions," greatly favor-
ing the franchisor); Brown, supra note 50, at 5, col. 1.
250. See, e.g., S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 61; B. WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 11-13.
251. See, e.g., C. VAUGHN, FRANCHISING TODAY: REPORT ON THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL MAN-
AGEMENT CONFERENCE ON FRANCHISING 174-75 (1970). Charles Vaughn relates how an officer of a
major franchisor stated: "When you sell this gentlemen the license, and he gives you $10,000, it is
like.., poker [and] he is giving that to the house. Marvelous industry, this franchising! Can you
imagine a fellow paying $10,000 for the right to pay you royalties for the rest of his life!" Id.
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them; if it fails, the franchisor simply will move on to other projects. 252
It is, thus, myopic to view the current maze of disclosure laws, re-
gistration requirements, state franchise and business opportunity prac-
tices statutes, and common-law contract principles as adequate
protections for franchisees. Although franchisees must abide by the
lawful contracts that they freely and knowingly make, for the following
reasons franchisees should not be prevented from organizing collec-
tively: (1) their franchising contracts rarely proscribe collective organi-
zation; (2) franchisees arguably have a constitutional and statutory
right of association; and (3) the risks that franchisees bear do not en-
compass the impairment of collective rights that they might otherwise
possess. It seems incongruous that a franchisor who uses an established
franchise operation's systemic advantages as a drawing card to attract
new franchisees, and who requires persons to pay for the privilege of
joining that membership system, would contend that franchisees gener-
ally cannot undertake significant joint efforts. Why must each fran-
chisee, then, "go it alone"? Just as the employee needs the right to
associate collectively with fellow employees to compensate for individ-
ual weaknesses, the franchisee also should have the right not only to
associate with other franchisees, but to demand and otherwise take col-
lective action without fear of legal reprisal.
Presently franchisees have limited associational rights and little
else. Many states have a statutory right of association.253 Also, the Con-
stitution may give franchisees a similar right.254 The right, however,
simply may mean no more than a prohibition of "yellow dog" contracts
in the franchising context.2 55 As such, right of association protections
252. See, e.g., Kealey Pharmacy v. Walgreen, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985); Domed Stadium
Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984); Copy-Data Sys. v. Toshiba Am., Inc.,
663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); White Hen Pantry v. Johnson, 599 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Wis. 1984);
Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1980); Diehl & Sons,
Inc. v. International Harvester, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see also S. LJXEN BRG,
supra note 4, at 259. Stan Luxenberg states that "many chain builders' franchisees serve as cannon
fodder, foot soldiers to be expended in battle. [In testing a market, the franchisor] can find opera-
tors .... If the experiment fails and the franchisees go bankrupt, well, that's too bad." Id. Lux-
enberg notes also that "[iun 1971 Ralston-Purina decided franchising was not profitable for its
Jack-in-the-Box chain. The huge food processor gave thirty days' notice to the owners of six hun-
dred forty-two franchises that their licenses had been terminated." Id. at 270.
253. The right is guaranteed, to a limited extent, by many state statutes. See supra Part
IH(C). Some useful purposes for state freedom of franchisee association statutes are stated infra at
text accompanying notes 298-300.
254. See supra Part III(A).
255. "Yellow dog" contracts were employment agreements in which the employee agreed not
to join a labor union. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), the Supreme Court invalidated a
Kansas statute that made it a misdemeanor for an employer to prohibit employees from joining or
remaining in a labor union during their term of employment. That decision essentially was over-
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may only accomplish for franchisees and their associations what the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 56 did with respect to employees and un-
ions-declare a right to join. Thereafter, any franchisee rights of associ-
ation are murky at best.
Labor law simply does not fill the void. As previously discussed,257
federal labor relations law rarely covers franchisees. Indeed, only the
protected few actually have been considered employees, and the facts in
those cases generally evinced a pattern of strict supervision, little en-
trepreneurial risk or profit potential, minimal ownership interests, and
often even a purposeful conversion to sham franchises just to avoid the
labor laws. Absent a dramatic shift in case law interpretation 2 5  or in
the statutes themselves, franchisee hopes for developing associational
protections within the established field of labor relations law are
pointless.
B. Proposal: An Antitrust Exemption, Not Collective Bargaining
Requirements
The Author is not convinced that placing franchisees within the
NLRA (or creating an NLRA-like construct for franchising) is neces-
sary, let alone wise. While one notable franchise attorney has long ar-
gued for franchisee collective bargaining rights comparable to those
held by employees, 25 one can accept his views about franchisee
problems without accepting his conclusion that we must have a fran-
chisee-franchisor relations law providing collective bargaining rights. 260
He and other proponents26'1 may be adept at showing present problems
that might be resolved by mandatory collective bargaining, but one can-
not be sure who is blessed with prescience about the broad future ef-
fects of a franchising NLRA. Requiring franchisors to enter into
collective bargaining with franchisee representatives is a huge step that
imprudently bypasses other smaller steps which should be tried first.
turned with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)). The provision outlawing "yellow dog" contracts is found at 29 U.S.C. §
103 (1988).
256. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1988).
257. See supra Part V.
258. In 1971 Professor Raymond McGuire called in vain for such changes. See generally Mc-
Guire, supra note 168.
259. H. BROWN, supra note 1, § 10.08 [5][b]; Brown, supra note 127, at 815; Brown, supra
note 50.
260. Harold Brown simply comments that "a constructive method for operational harmony"
in franchising "can only be accomplished through some form of collective bargaining." Brown,
supra note 50, at 5, col. 1. He argues also that collective bargaining is "the only realistic hope for
an effective franchising relationship." Brown, supra note 127, at 815; see also infra note 267. This
conclusion is certainly debatable.
261. See, e.g., Note, supra note 166, at 1294 (authored by law student Elizabeth Anania).
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For example, one smaller step would be the creation of an antitrust
exemption for some franchisee group activities. Franchisees thus could
organize, exchange information, make recommendations about business
policies, request that the franchisor bargain collectively, and perhaps
even strike. Of course, certain actions would remain unprotected, such
as pricing schemes, boycotts of third parties, and other actions that
have a direct impact on parties other than the franchisees and
franchisor. The antitrust exemption, consequently, could be crafted to
state clearly that, for purposes of dealing with the franchisor, the fran-
chisees' activities fall within the customary protections afforded to la-
bor organizations or agricultural marketing cooperatives.262 In effect,
franchisees would be permitted to use their collective economic leverage
to balance against their franchisor in the same way that employees use
these powers vis-h-vis their employer. Shielded actions by employees
with regard to wages, hours, working conditions, and other matters
would have protected counterparts in the franchising context covering,
inter alia, royalties and other fees, hours of operation, advertising,
262. See, e.g., Clayton Act of 1914 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) (exempting labor organizations
and the "legitimate objects thereof" from antitrust laws); Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 §§ 4, 5,
13(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113(c) (1988) (stating that no federal court shall have jurisdiction to
enjoin, as an unlawful combination or conspiracy, various protected actions during a "labor dis-
pute"); Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 § 1, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (clarifying and extending the Clay-
ton Act exemption to agricultural cooperatives).
As independent contractors who have joined together in marketing associations, farmers' coop-
eratives may be more analogous to franchisee associations than to labor unions. Numerous deci-
sions have applied the antitrust exemption in favor of such agricultural groups. See, e.g., Sunkist
Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962) (holding that three as-
sociations were not conspiring but were effectively one association and, thus, were exempt from the
Sherman Act); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Co-operative Best Growers Ass'n, 725 F.2d 564
(10th Cir. 1984) (finding that a farmers' cooperative was not subject to antitrust laws for keeping
individual members from contracting directly with the sugar manufacturer); Waters v. National
Farmers Org., 328 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Ind. 1971) (holding that farmers' group seeking collective
bargaining with processors of agricultural products was exempt from antitrust laws). Of course, the
exemption is not absolute. See, e.g., Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362
U.S. 458 (1960) (holding that exemption does not cover Sherman Act § 2 combinations, conspira-
cies to monopolize, or activities designed to restrain and suppress competition by independent
producers); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (holding that agreements with nonag-
ricultural groups to limit sales and fix dealers' prices to retailers are not exempt); Fairdale Farms,
Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980) (and cases cited therein) (stating that
the exemption does not protect predatory tactics, such as coerced membership and price discrimi-
nation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981); Boise Cascade Int'l, Inc. v. Northern Minn. Pulpwood
Producers Ass'n, 294 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Minn. 1968) (holding that members of pulpwood produc-
ers' association cannot boycott or persuade others to boycott when doing so breaches existing
contracts).
Note that these cooperatives, unlike labor unions, cannot require collective bargaining. There-
fore, they may resemble more closely the position of the franchisee association. See Note, Anti-
trust, Bargaining, and Cooperatives: ABC's of the National Agricultural Marketing and
Bargaining Act of 1971, 9 HAxv. J. ON LEGIS. 498 (1972) (discussing a congressional bill, subse-
quently killed, to give NLRA-like rights to agricultural cooperatives).
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quality control, and franchise termination. Outside the realm of fran-
chisee-franchisor relations, antitrust law could be used against franchis-
ees-either individually or as a group-just as antitrust law still
controls unions insofar as they run a business or otherwise operate
apart from labor-management relations.263
Absent a special collective bargaining requirement, the franchisor
still could ignore the franchisee association. Moreover, it still could try
to set up alternative franchisee groups, such as advisory councils. 26 4 The
antitrust exemption, however, already would have removed antitrust
law as one of the strongest weapons franchisors have for fighting
associations.265
Combined with a franchisee right of free association law, the anti-
trust exemption could bring to some franchisees the prospect of collec-
tive bargaining, if that were their desire.266 Much would depend on the
reactions of both franchisor and franchisee to a new bargaining power
equation-one tilted less in the franchisor's favor.267 In addition, the
parties' knowledge that their agreements could be enforced in court
might spur a sense of equality and reality.26e In other words, the law
should eradicate the notion that a franchisor always can back out of its
arrangements with the franchisees; while the decision to deal with the
franchisees may be voluntary, once an agreement is reached or the fran-
263. Many articles and other writings have reviewed the application of antitrust laws to labor
activities. See, e.g., Hoffmann, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1983); Kaminsky, The Antitrust Labor Exemption: An Employer Perspec-
tive, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 4 (1986); King & Smith, New Antitrust Developments Affecting Labor
Law, 33 SYRACusE L. REv. 945 (1982). In addition to the statutory exemption, courts have carved
out a nonstatutory exemption that provides some protection to employers-not just employees and
labor unions-concerning arm's-length collective bargaining on wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. Kaminsky, supra, at 32-51. Note, however, that if franchisee associations are given an anti-
trust exemption, public policy may require a similar exemption for franchisors.
264. This option is available unless the legislature decides that advisory councils present the
same problems as company unions did in the 1920s and early 1930s. In that case, the legislature
could outlaw or otherwise restrict franchisor involvement in the operation of franchisee groups.
The Author believes such action should prove unnecessary. The trend already appears to be that,
as franchised systems mature, franchisees gravitate toward an independent group, not one with
close ties to the franchisor. Moreover, an antitrust exemption for all franchisee groups likely would
give a further boost to independent associations because franchisors would be left with a reduced
arsenal for attacking associations. Concerning franchisor use of the antitrust laws against franchis-
ees, see supra Part VI.
265. See supra Part VI.
266. This may not happen. Because franchisees traditionally see themselves as businessper-
sons, not unionizers, some franchisees still may prefer to retain individual control.
267. Harold Brown argues that a "special form of collective bargaining should be devised for
groups of franchisees" and that "only the collective power of franchisees' group activity can miti-
gate [though presumably not eliminate] the gross imbalance between the parties." H. BROWN,
supra note 1, § 10.08[5][b], at 10-102 (emphasis added).
268. Such enforcement actions could be brought under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) (discussing
suits by and against labor organizations), contract law, or equity.
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chisees reasonably rely on the franchisor's recognition of their associa-
tion, the franchisees ought to have the power to compel the franchisor
to honor its commitments. 69
Rights of free association, a limited antitrust exemption, and the
ability to enforce collective agreements do not impose "collectivism" on
unwilling franchisors or disinclined franchisees. 270 To push for a
franchising relations act that forces franchisors to accept collective bar-
gaining ignores many salient legal, economic, and political concerns
about the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
First, most franchisees are not in the same legal or economic posi-
tion as employees. 271 At the very least, they must be classified as man-
agers or supervisors, not ordinary employees. Although perhaps not
truly independent contractors, franchisees legally still do not fall under
a worker category generally protected by labor law. To treat them as so
protected would require major reworking of other areas of labor law,
both to maintain legal consistency, and to prevent or compensate for
economic dislocations that presumably would result from the differ-
ences in labor law treatment of franchisees, other independent contrac-
tors, and supervisory or managerial employees.
Second, franchisee collective bargaining requires adequate safe-
guards, such as detailed and explicit legislative pronouncements.
Otherwise, such rights - by analogy or other creative legal interpreta-
tion-could be used to alter, perhaps without any foresight, the law in
many other areas. These areas include: Labor relations for franchisees'
employees, the law of vicarious liability and other agency issues within
the franchising context, employment law, franchise contract law,
franchisor disclosures and other protections for prospective franchisees,
and federal preemption of state franchise and business opportunity
laws.
Third, there is very little history of franchisee-franchisor collective
bargaining. Even when it has occurred informally, 272 general conclusions
269. If read broadly, a portion of Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372 v. NLRB, 735
F.2d 969, 971 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985), unfortunately may be interpreted
as giving the franchisor a ready means of extrication from collective talks or even agreements with
the franchisee association. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. How far would this
franchisor freedom not to recognize a "union" of nonemployees go? Such capricious or otherwise
unfair reneging should not be tolerated. Franchisors should understand that their dealings with an
association-although voluntary-can produce reciprocal and binding rights and duties.
270. A discussion on binding all franchisees to a collective bargaining agreement is found
infra at note 296 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part V.
272. The Holiday Inn, Midas, and Pizza Hut systems are notable examples. See, e.g., S. Lux.
ENBERG, supra note 4, at 266-69; B. WEasTsR, supra note 8, at 195-96; see also National Muffier
Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 473 (1979) (describing how Midas muffler franchisees
formed an association whose principal activity was to serve as a bargaining agent for the franchis-
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have proved difficult: isolated cases concerning voluntary negotiations
between a franchisor and an association are not the equivalent of forced
collective bargaining. It clearly would be easier to proceed if more sub-
stantial legal and economic reference points existed other than analo-
gies to the NLRA system, which has far different historical, legal, and
economic underpinnings.
Fourth, from both the franchisor's and franchisee's viewpoints, the
use of franchising stems from legal, economic, and social considerations
that run counter to those represented by a collective bargaining ap-
proach. Suppliers and others choose to issue franchises for a multitude
of reasons, with many important reasons arising from a desire to avoid
the employment relationship and corresponding labor law issues.273
Similarly, franchisees typically were motivated to enter into a franchise
relationship by a desire to be more than an employee, to be a capitalist
rather than a proletarian. At least initially, it seems that a franchisee is
generally oriented not toward status as a member of a class of franchis-
ees, but toward an individual relationship with the franchisor and a
role, however small, as an independent businessperson. 4
Fifth, collective bargaining may foster or exacerbate an unduly ad-
versarial approach to franchisee-franchisor relations. As labor law grap-
ples with issues of improved productivity and cooperation between
labor and management,7 5 the advent of required franchise collective
bargaining could be seen as a move in the wrong direction, toward
group confrontation rather than more individualized, constructive
communication.
Finally, and perhaps most important, a push for collective bargain-
ing flies in the face of political reality. Franchisors have a very powerful
lobbying organization, the International Franchise Association (IFA).
Certainly the IFA, which has been instrumental in defeating numerous
congressional bills, state legislative drafts, and federal or state rulemak-
ing proposals, 16 will battle vigorously the very notion of required col-
lective bargaining, 7 7 an idea with far more serious consequences than
ees in dealing with Midas, how the association persuaded Midas to eliminate a customer service fee
requirement, and how it successfully negotiated a new form of franchise agreement).
273. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
274. This is the conclusion of Stan Luxenberg, who states that "many of the franchisees were
dedicated capitalists with strong anti-union sentiments." S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 266.
275. See, e.g., Smith & Childs, Imported from America: Cooperative Labor Relations at New
United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., 9 hNus. RE.L. L.J. 70 (1987).
276. See S. LUENBERG, supra note 4, at 243-46.
277. See H. BRowN, supra note 1, § 5.01 (explaining that "franchisors universally have
fought all franchisee efforts to establish collective bargaining, since this would impugn the
franchisors' established superiority"); see also supra notes 120-25, 143-44 and accompanying text.
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much of the law the IFA already has opposed so successfully.2 78 Fran-
chisee efforts probably would be better served by demanding implemen-
tation of a strong, meaningful right of free association and the easing of
antitrust constraints on their organizational activities.2 79 Both of these
goals seem more manageable for three reasons: (1) associational rights
already are found in the proposed Uniform Act and in many states'
general or special-industry franchise laws;20 (2) antitrust law has long
been under attack by legal commentators; and (3) easing antitrust en-
forcement has been, in many respects, a national policy this past
decade.281
C. The Rise of Franchisee Associations, Collective Efforts, and
Freedom of Association Statutes
Compared to prior decades, franchising has matured.28 2 The pre-
dominant issues for the 1990s are not flagrant abuses as in earlier years,
but the long-term problem of defining standards of conduct for the con-
tinuing relationship between franchisors and franchisees.28 3
The rise of franchisee associations is part of this trend. They not
only serve the interests of comparatively weak, often inexperienced
franchisees,284 but they also counterbalance franchisors' well-en-
278. Franchisees might establish a better case for collective bargaining if there were more
statutes like New Hampshire's and Vermont's and if those statutes were reinforced by some collec-
tive bargaining history or administrative or court decisions.
This situation is similar to that of job applicants who cannot find jobs because they have no
work experience, and thus, ironically, never get the work experience they need. Until there are
more states with franchising collective bargaining laws, some will argue that the almost complete
absence of these laws shows that there is no need for them or that one should wait until there is
more meaningful legislative guidance. If all legislatures have that attitude, new laws might never
develop in this field. As discussed briefly supra at text accompanying notes 259-61, the Author is
not arguing for more required collective bargaining laws. What is needed, simply, is more
franchisor-franchisee experience with collective bargaining, whether mandated or voluntary. See
supra text accompanying notes 259-69.
279. One assumes also that there would be no cramped interpretation as to the enforceability
of franchisor-franchisee collective agreements (i.e., not permitting franchisees to back out when-
ever they desire). See supra notes 208, 268-69 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Parts I11(B) & (0).
281. See Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321 (1987); Private Antitrust
Enforcement: Preparing and Prosecuting Actions in a New Antitrust Era, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 267
(1989). Public enforcement resources have fallen drastically since 1980, from 429 professional staff
at the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to 236 by 1988. Hearings Before Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-53 (1988). Studies likewise have shown a decline in
private antitrust cases starting in the early- to mid-1970s. See Brodley, Critical Factual Assump-
tions Underlying Public Policy, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEw EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING
252-67 (L. White ed. 1988).
282. Garner, Editor's Column, 8 FRANCHISE L.J., Spring 1989, at 2, 16.
283. Id.
284. Most franchisors actually may want inexperienced franchisees. A study, including a poll
of franchisors, reached that conclusion nearly 20 years ago. U. OZANNE & S. HUNT, supra note 9, at
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trenched economic and political positions2 6 and, therefore, serve a le-
gitimate public interest.28 6 Franchisees' weaker individual powers may
result in a skewing of capital investment,287 labor resources alloca-
tion, 8 site selection,289 and other decisions, producing results that are
in no one's long-term interest except perhaps the franchisor's. 2 90 A fran-
chisee association, however, that tends to equalize the balance of power
between franchisor and franchisee could eliminate or diminish the num-
ber and severity of these one-sided decisions. The franchised system
would serve better the franchisee's profit motive and thus better align it
with other forms of business and with rational economic decision
making.291
While not necessarily constituting franchisee unions, the associa-
125.
285. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n. v. United States,
440 U.S. 472 (1979) (No. 77-1172); supra notes 130, 249, 277, 282 and accompanying text; cf. supra
notes 159-61 and accompanying text (regarding franchisor uses for an advisory council).
286. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 28, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440
U.S. 472 (1979) (No. 77-1172); see also supra Part V(A).
287. This may occur when franchisees pay high franchise fees and royalties instead of seek-
ing other, perhaps better, uses of capital. Thus, a misuse of individual and societal resources arises
with the entry-level decision to franchise. See generally S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 284-88
(contending that franchising often has resulted in a lessening of national prosperity and productiv-
ity, unacceptable risks and losses to numerous franchisees, and damage to the economy and social
fabric of individual communities); Rubin, supra note 9, at 224 (noting that persons take much
greater financial risks by becoming franchisees than, for example, investing in a diversified stock
portfolio). For individual franchisees this unwise allocation of resources may continue throughout
the term of the franchise, perhaps even upon the demand of the franchisor. See, e.g., B. WEBSTER,
supra note 8, at 107 (stating that franchise contracts sometimes require franchisees to remove
their existing equipment every few years and replace that equipment with more expensive, new
items, regardless of how well the older equipment was functioning and how much longer it was
expected to last). Economists have analyzed the high levels of sunk costs borne by franchisees and
the resulting problem of franchisors' "opportunism": the ability to extract (via increased fees,
higher rents, etc.) all that a franchisee has invested without risking the franchisees' departure from
the franchised system. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Williamson, Transaction-
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
288. E.g., franchisees and their employees spend a great deal of time and effort on futile,
franchisor-imposed initiatives. S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 55-56 (noting that franchisees "may
be used to pioneer untested areas where sales are uncertain," with franchisees often providing
"cheap labor" for the franchisor); id. at 286 (concluding that thousands of franchisees invest
months or years in unsuccessful projects and "emerge from the experience devastated"); supra
notes 250-52 and accompanying text; see also B. WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that a
franchisee is "subjected to time-consuming, often annoying, reporting and supervisory
requirements").
289. See S. LUXENBERG, supra note 4, at 55.
290. See id. at 288-89.
291. This should be preferable to having franchisees primarily serve a sales-boosting function
(both sales of franchises to new franchisees and, at existing franchises, sales of services or goods to
franchise customers), regardless of net profits. See supra note 84. Without franchisee association
protections, the franchisees merely may be "cannon fodder": the true risk-bearers for ideas dic-
tated from franchisor headquarters. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
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tions can trace their origins to a need for dealing with a sometimes in-
sensitive, common superior, who has substantially greater powers than
the individual franchisee.2 a9 In the future, franchisee associations could
be at the vanguard of an attempt to transfer franchise conflict resolu-
tion from the courtrooms and legislative halls to the participants them-
selves. Just as courts have come to recognize a national labor policy
favoring private dispute resolution, 93 franchising law may hold a simi-
lar preference for private resolution of conflicts. Progress toward that
end could occur through franchisees' increasing use of associations, cou-
pled with franchisors' positive acceptance of associations.
Collective bargaining may be a necessary component of a private
resolution approach that attempts system-wide prevention or settling of
franchisee-franchisor conflicts.294 Thus, despite the various problems
with requiring collective bargaining,295 it ultimately may be necessary.
Perhaps it would be necessary also to go beyond requiring collective
bargaining and make a "majority rule" for representation of franchises
like that in labor law for nonunion or dissident employees. This would
bind some franchisees to collective choices even though they would
rather contract individually with franchisors.9 s
A more modest step, however, would be to remove some of the an-
titrust fetters from franchisee associations. As amply demonstrated in
the literature and in case law, franchisors still would have plenty of
methods for dealing with unlawful or inappropriate activities by one or
more franchisees.297
292. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 8, 28, 30, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) (No. 77-1172).
293. See Clayton v. United Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981) (discussing collec-
tive bargaining disputes); Majewski v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, 721 F.2d 823, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussing bargaining agreements between an employer and its supervisory-managerial employees'
association).
294. See supra notes 259-61 & 267.
295. See supra Part VI(B).
296. There could be many problems with such an approach. If franchise collective bargaining
became an accepted practice, the franchising community and ultimately legislatures and courts
would have to decide such issues. For fundamental NLRA law on this point, see Emporium Cap-
well Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). All three decisions give
the collective interests represented by a certified bargaining unit (a union) priority over those in-
terests espoused by dissident employees. See also supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting
"the independent contractor nature" of franchisees, the separate and sometimes different contract
each franchisee has with the franchisor, and the franchisor's need to preserve communication with
every franchisee, not just those belonging to an association); supra note 136 (noting the distinct
nature of individual gasoline dealers' contracts with their supplier).
297. Obviously, franchisors do not have to turn to antitrust claims when opposing franchisee
associations or their individual members, whether with good or improper motives. See, e.g., Jay
Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 708 F.2d 814 (1st Cir.) (discussing a distribu-
tor who tried to terminate and otherwise take private action against dealers who had formed a
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Franchisee freedom of association statutes perhaps cover little, if
any, ground not already covered affirmatively by the first amendment
or negatively through limits in antitrust and unfair competition law.
One wonders: Is there really any room between these two parameters
for an association statute to be effective? Nonetheless, even assuming
that the general groundwork already has been provided for and occu-
pied by other laws, a freedom of association statute still may serve fun-
damental purposes.
For instance, an association statute could give specific notice to
franchisors about the state of the law. 98 While notice is not generally a
requirement for imposing liability,299 it certainly could remove obstacles
to substantial punishment for offending franchisors, such as ignorance
of the law. More importantly, a clear statute better enunciates public
policy and removes doubt from the law. Additionally, a statute on asso-
ciational rights could develop what currently amounts to vague consti-
tutional principles, case law dicta, and antitrust notions into a full
statement on franchisees' rights of association. If this area of franchis-
ing law, like much of the law on franchising, is based on the broad and
simple concept of fairness, the law certainly should be spelled out more
clearly.
With a right of association statute in place, specific remedies for
violations could be codified or else promulgated through regulations.
Criminal and civil enforcement measures thus would become part of the
overall statutory or regulatory framework, which would help define
franchisor-franchisee expectations. Absent a statute and formal en-
forcement provisions, a right of association may be available only
against some parties-such as the government-and not franchisors3 00
"dealer alliance" for bargaining with the distributor, and ruling against the distributor for viola-
tion of New Hampshire's automobile dealership statute), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Brown,
supra note 127, at 775. Brown discusses a franchisees' association that, after 10 months of unsuc-
cessful bargaining with a franchisor, notified its members of the need to litigate and requested
their participation and financial support. Upon disclosure of these facts at a preliminary hearing in
Halverson v. Convenience Food Mart, No. 70C-499 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 3, 1970), the district court
dismissed the suit on the merits and even lodged a complaint with the Illinois Bar Association
against the association's attorney for his participation in alleged solicitation. See also Schupack v.
McDonald's Sys., 200 Neb. 485, 264 N.W.2d 827 (1978). In Schupack the Nebraska Supreme Court
overturned a judgment in favor of alleged transferees of a right of first refusal concerning new
franchises. The court, in finding for McDonald's, devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to the
seemingly unreliable testimony of the plaintiff's chief witness, the president of "an association of
dissident McDonald's franchisees." Id. at 489, 264 N.W.2d at 829.
298. This would be no mean task considering the quagmire of existing statutes, rules, and
case law. See supra Part H(B).
299. Certainly, more "basic," less specific laws such as antitrust statutes, the Constitution,
and resulting case law can be crucial in their effect on franchisee association formation and subse-
quent activities. See supra Part I1(A) & Part VI.
300. For example, the first amendment to the Constitution involves rights against govern-
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Furthermore, without statutory enforcement provisions, it may be only
a public right, with solely the government entitled to bring an action.
D. Final Thoughts
The franchisees' rights of association to this point have been a
mere "will-o'-the-wisp," luring those who expected much more to the
ultimate realization that little exists in the case law, and what does ex-
ist is nearly lost among major areas of franchise, antitrust, and labor
law. Given the growth of franchisee associations, however, the maturing
of franchising both as a concept and as applied in particular industries
and individual chains, and the continuing disparity of power between
franchisor and franchisee, there is a need for legislative and judicial rec-
ognition of the franchisees' right and need to join together. Moreover,
franchisees can be afforded a realistic opportunity to deal effectively
with the franchisor only by taking external pressures off the franchis-
ees' collective efforts. To reduce these legal, economic, and political
pressures, the most practical approach may be to restrict the use of an-
titrust laws in stifling franchisees' organizational efforts and other fran-
chisee union-like activities.
Presently, the law considers the individual franchisee an indepen-
dent contractor unentitled to collective bargaining rights and probably
unsuited for those rights anyway. The franchisee is in a subordinate
legal and economic position, which renders him too dependent for effec-
tive bargaining on his own.301
A limited antitrust exemption would be no panacea, but franchisors
who resist any change ultimately may confront their worst fears-a col-
lective bargaining requirement springing to life in various states, and
perhaps even federal law, well beyond the gasoline dealership require-
ments in New Hampshire and Vermont. This may never happen, but it
would be less likely to occur if some weight were given to freedom of
association provisions and if the antitrust laws were not permitted to
render those statutes a virtual nullity. As bargaining and other
franchisor-franchisee relationships develop in response to an exemp-
tion, and as further cases arise under right of association provisions, one
may see then that a franchise NLRA is not really needed. At the very
least, if further action is required, legislatures and courts may proceed
more adroitly, building upon lessons that the antitrust exemption and
statutory franchisee association rights have taught us.
mental interference, not purely private wrongs.
301. Put simply, the typical franchisee is too "independent" from other franchisees to bar-
gain collectively, but too dependent on the franchisor to bargain alone.
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STATE FRANCHISE AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES STATUTES
(As OF JANUARY 1990)
1. Disclosure Only (20 states)*
Alabama*A New Hampshire
Alaska New Mexico
Arizona Ohio
Colorado Oklahoma
Idaho Oregon
Kansas Pennsylvania
Louisiana*L Texas*T
Massachusetts Vermont
Montana West Virginia
Nevada Wyoming
2. Registration (with Exemptions)**
and Disclosure (8 states)
Florida*F Maine
Georgia North Carolina
Kentucky South Carolina
Iowa Utah
3. Registration"* and Disclosure (4
states)
Maryland North Dakota
New York Rhode Island
4. Prohibitions*P and Disclosure* (7 states,
D.C., P.R. & V.I.)
Arkansas Nebraska
Delaware New Jersey
District of Puerto Rico
Columbia Tennessee
Mississippi*M Virgin Islands
Missouri*
5. Prohibitions*P Registration (with
Exemptions),** and Disclosure (1 state)
Connecticut
6. Prohibitions*P Registration,*** and
Disclosure (10 states)
California Minnesota
Hawaii South Dakota
Illinois Virginia
Indiana Washington
Michigan Wisconsin
* These states require no registration at all: none of their state franchise statutes requires it, and
even if the state has a "business opportunities" law providing for registration, that particular law
does not require any significant franchise registrations.
*A Alabama has no franchise statute. The Alabama business opportunities law simply prohibits
misrepresentation. ALA. CODE § 8-19-5(20) (1984).
.F Florida law proscribes misrepresentation, FLA. STAT. § 817.416 (1976), but specifies no other
prohibited practices.
*L Louisiana has no franchise statute. Some prohibitions, however, may be found in the business
opportunities act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51-1823 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989), but there is a very
broad exemption for the licensing of a registered trademark, which is a commonplace arrangement
in franchising. See id. § 51-1823(3).
.M Prohibitions or restrictions are a (a) statutory limitation of events that can result immediately
in a franchise termination, or (b) required notice at least 90 days before other, nonautomatic ter-
minations or nonrenewals. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-53 (Supp. 1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.405
(1990). Neither state has a registration or disclosure requirement.
*P The term "prohibitions" includes restrictions on practices. For explanations and examples of
prohibitions or restrictions, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
*T If franchisor complies with the FTC disclosure rule, it need only file a notice to the state, with
the form merely including the franchisor's actual name, "doing business" name, and address.
** Registration of franchises in these states takes place solely via business opportunities legisla-
tion, not franchising laws specifically. Many or most franchisors qualify for exemptions from
registration.
*** This category includes some states that do not require large, experienced, financially sound
franchisors to register. See supra note 25. This exemption is not treated as applying to "many or
most franchises" (categories 2 & 5).
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